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LOOKING AT COMMUNITIES AND MARKETS
Lan Cao*
INTRODUCTION
The dominant discourse on civil rights in the United States has
been a discourse on and critique of political rather than economic
institutions,' public rather than private lawmaking.2 To the extent
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law; Associate
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. For their comments I thank Professors
Charles Clotfelter, Neil Cohen, James Fanto, Bailey Kuklin, Norman Poser, Larry
Solan, Anthony Sebok, Spencer Weber Wailer, and Steve Winter. I am also especially
grateful for the extensive and penetrating criticism I received from Professors Arthur
Pinto, Thomas Rowe, Jr., and William Van Alstyne. I'd like to express my
appreciation to the participants of the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics
at Georgetown University Law Center for their comments, especially Professors Viet
Dinh, Steven Salop, Warren Schwartz, and Jane Stromseth, and the faculty at Duke
University School of Law, to whom I presented this Article at a faculty workshop. The
Article was supported by a summer research stipend granted by Dean Joan Wexler
and Brooklyn Law School.
1 Since Pessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), in which the Supreme Court held that "separate but
equal" facilities did not violate the constitutional requirement of equal protection, the
struggle for civil rights has been primarily a struggle to eradicate de jure barriers to
political equality under the law.
American legal culture and tradition generally accept "that there is a crucial dif-
ference between civil and political rights on the one hand and social and economic
rights on the other. The American system guarantees civil and political rights-but it
does not guarantee those social and economic rights described in the United Nations'
Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair
Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HItv. L. Rxv. 1312, 1326 (1986).
2 By state or public lawmaking, I mean the process by which centralized law is
made, for example, the top-down enactment of statutes or the issuance of regulations
and decrees. The source of law is the state. For a discussion of the relationship be-
tween the sovereign and society, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 49-76
(1961); for a discussion of the "habit of obedience" to the sovereign, see 1 JOHN Aus-
TIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOsOPriY OF PosrrIVE LAw 220-24 (Robert
Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1885).
As Weyrauch and Bell noted, "[elven if we recognize contracts as a form of pri-
vate lawmaking, it is assumed that we make formal agreements essentially with dele-
gated state power." Walter Otto Weyrauch & Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous
Lawmaking: The Case of the " psies, 103 YALE L.J. 323, 326 (1993). For example, Hart
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that economic issues surface, they have been subsumed under and
incorporated into the traditional civil rights model of public law,
which has produced two prevailing strands of thought: first, equal
treatment or antidiscrimination, that is, treating like people alike,3
and second, affirmative action, that is, when equal treatment alone is
explained that "many of the features which puzzle us in the institutions of contract or
property are clarified by thinking of the operations of making a contract or transfer-
ring property as the exercise of limited legislative powers by individuals." Id. at 326
n.4 (citing HART, supra, at 94). "According to these notions, the legitimacy of lawmak-
ing depends on the authority of the state, or at least on the degree to which the state
tolerates private lawmaking." Id. at 326.
Private lawmaking, on the other hand, arises from an array of autonomous insti-
tutions, communities, and groups. During the Middle Ages in Europe and prior to
the rise of a central authority, private associations had a significant degree of auton-
omy to make rules and to conduct themselves in accordance with the custom of their
associations. See Weyrauch & Bell, supra, at 327 n.6, for a discussion of sources that
deal with the internal ordering of associations as well as those of "aggregated units
that are characterized by little or no commonality of purpose."
The informal lawmaking of medieval private guilds can be seen in its modern
version "whenever people join in groups, associations, or institutions to pursue com-
mon objectives." Id. at 327. Private lawmaking is analogous to the process by which
decentralized law is made, through the bottom-up emergence of norms and customs
that percolate from a structure of private ordering. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Decen-
tralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law
Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643 (1996).
For a defense of an evolutionary approach to lawmaking, see FRIEDRICH CHARLES
VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE
(Arno Press 1975) (Abraham Hayward trans., London 1831). Savigny attacked a pro-
posal to adopt one unified code of laws for all the German principalities, a proposal
arising out of the view that "all law, in its concrete form, is founded upon the express
enactments of the supreme power." Id. at 20-21. According to Savigny, law "is first
developed by custom.., next byjurisprudence,-everywhere, therefore, by internal
silently-operating powers, not by the arbitrary will of a law-giver." Id. at 30.
The terms "public" and "private" law have been used more frequently in other
contexts and have also carried a variety of other meanings. Because the public/pri-
vate distinction emerged from the notion that there is a separate and distinct private
order, private law was deemed law that protected "pre-political rights.... Private law,
then, was that part of the legal system protecting the private ordering; public law
consisted of government compulsions restricting private freedom." Daniel A. Farber
& Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the New
Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 875, 886 (1991). Under that definition, property law,
tort law, and contract law may be considered examples of private law, and labor law
and constitutional law public law. See id. at 886-87.
3 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h (1994 & Supp. I 1997). Racial discrimina-
tion in the following areas are prohibited: denial of equal protection-voting is cov-
ered by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-74e (1994) (Subch. I); public accommodations (Subch.
II); public facilities (Subch. III); public schools (Subch. IV); federally assisted pro-
grams (Subch. V); government employment (Subch. VI).
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deemed insufficient and the state adopts affirmative action to correct
discrimination.4 Despite these conceptual differences, in both in-
stances the theoretical underpinning of the civil rights movement has
been the concept of "equal justice under law,"5 and hence the empha-
sis on public rather than private lawmaking, legislation, and litiga-
tion-rather than community and norms or "habits, customs, and
ethics."
6
4 Issued in 1965, Executive Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R., 1965 Supp. 167 (1965),
reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app. at 538-41 (1994), required government agencies
and private contractors to adopt "affirmative action" and "ensure ... that employees
are treated during employment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or
national origin."
5 Abram, supra note 1, at 1312. For an account of the "equal opportunity" versus
"affirmative action" split within the civil rights movement, see Paul Brest, The Supreme
Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L.
REv. 1, 2-3 (1976). For a critique of both the "equal opportunity" and "affirmative
action" strands as both inadequate and anachronistic to current realities, see Anthony
D. Talbi, Racial Justice in the Age of the Global Economy: Community Empowerment and
Global Strategy, 44 DuKE L.J. 928, 931 (1995) ("[C]ivil rights ideologies, rather than
constituting a critique of liberal social relations and institutions, are instead an ex-
pression of them.").
6 FRANCIS FnuIyAMA, TRUST 5 (1996). For the purpose of this Article, culture
can be defined as "systems of shared ideas, systems of concepts and rules and mean-
ings that underlie and are expressed in the ways that humans live." ROGER M. KEs-
ING, CULTuRAL ANTHROPOLOGr. A CoEMPoRARY PERSPECTIVE 518 (2d ed. 1981).
Anthropologists have attempted different approaches to defining the essence of cul-
ture. See FRANK R. VIVELO, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY. A HANDBOOK 10 (1978)
(describing multiple definitions of culture). Most agree, however, that culture affects
one's values, perceptions, beliefs, and conduct. See, e.g., A.L. KROEBER, ANTHROPOL-
oGY: CULTURE PATrERNS AND PROCESSES 1 (1948); Stella Ting-Tooney, Toward a Theory
of Conflict and Culture, in COMMUNICATION, CULTURE AND ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESSES
(William B. Gudykunst et al. eds., 1985). Anthropologists have within the last two
decades refined their understanding of culture away from a notion of a fixed, static
set of beliefs, values, behavior, and institutions and more toward a redefinition of
culture as a flexible and evolutionary system, itself a process of persistent contestation
over its own internal meanings, produced and reproduced over time, unbounded
rather than bounded. See, e.g., JAMES CLuoRD, THE PREDICAMENT Or CULTURE
(1988); GEORGE -MARCUS & MICiAEL FISHER, WRTING CULTURE (1986). Culture con-
sists of many evolving and interactive aspects and is not "just the sum of habitual
practices." JOHN CoMARoFF &JEAN CoMARoFF, ETHNOGRAPHYAND THE HISTORICAL IM-
AGINATION 27 (1992).
As I discuss later, those from a common culture with an intricate network of
shared cultural norms and ethical systems are more likely to create with and for each
other "moral communities because their shared languages of good and evil give their
members a common moral life" and facilitate the creation of trust among members.
FuiyAMA, supra, at 36. The existence of a common cultural system in a close-knit
ethnically homogeneous community makes it more likely for a community market
among community members to be established.
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As economic difficulties increase and lower-income communities
suffer a disproportionate impact ofjob losses and other social disloca-
tions,7 economic issues are becoming increasingly paramount in our
national debates. 8 Because access to capital is a crucial factor in the
operation of small businesses, which in turn is essential to community
economic development, studies have indicated that firms which are
able to have their capital requirements met are more likely to survive
than firms which have no access to capital.9 More precisely, debt in-
puts in particular constitute a significant factor in the increased viabil-
ity of white-owned businesses.1 0
Where economic disparities have been noted, attempts at rectifi-
cation have been filtered primarily through the traditional public law
methodology of the civil rights model.1 For example, in response to
the claim of credit discrimination, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act1
2
(ECOA) was enacted in accordance with the prevailing norms of
7 See NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA (1994).
8 In 1993, white households had a net worth of $45,740, about ten times that of
black households, which had a net worth of $4,418, and Hispanic households, with a
net worth of $4,656. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTIC BRIEF: ASSET OWNERSHIP OF
HOUSEHOLDS 1993 (issued November 1995). In 1988, the median net worth for white
households was $43,279, and the median net worth for African American households
and Hispanic households was $4,169 and $5,524.3, respectively. See Gualberto Me-
dina, Minority Access to Capita; STANDARD & POOR'S REVIEW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL
SERVICES, May 19, 1993, at 95. In 1989, the median net worth for white households
was $58,500 and $4,000 for nonwhite households. See id.
Minority-owned firms accounted for 11% of the total number of individual pro-
prietorships, partnerships, and Subchapter S corporations in the United States and
6% of their gross receipts in 1992. See 1992 ECONOMIC CENSUS: SURVEY OF MINORIY-
OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES at 5; see also Thomas S. Mulligan, Understanding the Riots:
Six Months Later, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1992, atJJ1. In South Central Los Angeles, a
predominantly African American area, only 8,646 South Central residents, or 4.2% of
the total working population, identified themselves as self-employed in the 1990 U.S.
Census. The self-employment rate countywide was 7.9%. The absence of businesses
in the area has resulted in "leakage," that is, residents spending more money outside
rather than inside the community. See id.
9 See Medina, supra note 8, at 97.
10 A 1993 study reported that while white applicants were able to obtain between
$1.91 and $2.09 in debt capital for every dollar of equity capital provided by the loan
applicants, black applicants were able to obtain only $.69 to $.74 in debt capital for
the same dollar offered as equity capital. See id.
11 There have been some attempts in the civil rights movement, for example, the
Reverend Jesse Jackson's Operation Push and Minister Farrakhan's Nation of Islam,
to address on a concerted and systematic basis the issue of economic, as opposed to
civil, rights.
12 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1994 & Supp. II 1997). See also Regulation B, 12
C.F.R. § 202 (1993), which was issued pursuant to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.
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equal treatment and antidiscrimination to ensure that financial insti-
tutions treat like applicants alike, without resort to unacceptable, dis-
criminatory criteria,'3  and that all applicants have an equal
opportunity to compete for credit.14 By contrast, the Community Re-
investment Act (CRA) 15 takes the affirmative action route by directing
banks to serve low-income neighborhoods within their areas of opera-
tion to ensure actual lending by financial institutions in such
communities.
Both the ECOA and the CRA16 emerge from the traditional civil
rights model, which emphasizes public lawmaking as a remedy for dis-
crimination, despite the fact that there may be nonracial, economi-
cally motivated reasons as well. The public law model, in other words,
presumes that inadequate credit is caused primarily, if not exclusively,
by racially discriminatory lending practices and proposes to rectify the
problem by transposing the articulation of legal rights, legal remedies,
and legal sanctions into the arena of economics. These efforts may be
laudable attempts to ensure fair lending, equal access to credit, and in
the case of the CRA, affirmative lending and investment in local com-
munities. They constitute, however, only a partial picture because
they fail to address the economics of lending in the open market and
the high transaction costs that are also responsible, in many cases, for
13 See 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (a) (1994). The ECOA was originally concerned only with
sex and marital status. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495,
§ 701 (a), 88 Stat. 1521, 1521 (1974). A 1976 amendment expanded the Act's scope to
include race and other characteristics. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amend-
ments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, § 701(a), 90 Stat. 251, 251.
14 The ECOA is also designed to achieve a level playing field of information. See,
e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a) (1993) (requiring creditors to notify credit applicants within
30 days of any action taken pursuant to the credit application and additionally to
provide an 6xplanation for a denial of credit).
15 See Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1147 (1977) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 2901-2907 (1994 & Supp. II 1997)).
16 My analysis of the limits faced by public lawmaking is focused more on the
CRA than the ECOA. Unlike the CRA, the ECOA's statutory scheme is process-ori-
ented, not result-oriented, and does not involve the state in a substantive inquiry into
banking decisions.
The CRA has been criticized as being vague and ambiguous. See Michael
Klausner, Market Failure and Community Investment: Market-Oriented Alternative to the
Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1561, 1561 (1995). For criticism of the
CRA as promoting an outdated "ideology of localism" out of step with the globaliza-
tion of financial markets, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey Miller, The Community
Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REv. 291, 303-12 (1993), and as pro-
moting credit quotas and wealth redistribution, see Peter P. Swire, Safe Harbors and a
Proposal to Improve the Community Reinvestment Act, 79 VA. L. REv. 349, 351 (1993).
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the reluctance of banks to lend to certain borrowers and certain
communities.
The lack of sufficient lending to members of lower-income com-
munities has been caused by both discrimination and/or market im-
perfections. Although there is little doubt that the public law
framework is necessary to remedy discriminatory lending caused by
racial animus, it has been less effective at correcting economically ra-
tional lending behavior caused by market forces. Lenders need accu-
rate information about borrowers' creditworthiness before lending.
Without an efficient infrastructure to correct the problems posed by
information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers and to pro-
vide accurate information exchange, the transaction costs banks incur
to screen, monitor, and enforce loans are too burdensome to make
the transaction economically worthwhile. Neither the ECOA nor the
CRA is effective at providing the requisite exchange mechanisms that
constitute the preconditions necessary to create a market.
This Article examines how the private law framework of immi-
grant communities utilizes communal cohesiveness not only to bypass
formal barriers in the open market but also to establish a market-
what I call a "community market"-by contracting back into a com-
munity arrangement where every member contributes a set amount of
money into a rotating credit association at set times, until all have had
a chance to collect. As I discuss below, a rotating credit association
functions only if every member who has already claimed her share
does not default by defecting but rather continues to contribute until
the final rotation when every member has had a chance to collect.
Part I of this Article briefly explores the role of capital and credit
in economic development and discusses efforts in the United States to
regulate the formal market for credit, through the public civil rights
framework of the ECOA and the CRA. Second, applying Coase's the-
ory of transaction costs' 7 to the problem of institutional finance, Part I
also examines the information and monitoring costs incurred by
17 See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMIcA. 386, 390-98 (1937);
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Coase's Theorem
introduces the notion of transaction costs (generally "the costs of effecting a transfer
of rights") into economic and legal arrangements and poses the question of how to
minimize such costs. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 30 (2d ed.
1977). Coase stated that legal decisions and law have no consequence on economic
output, assuming no transaction costs. For example, no matter what the assignment
of legal rights to a property is, it will be used by the producer who can most maximize
the net income from production (unless transaction costs outweigh potential benefits
derived from transacting to reassign the rights) because the initial owner of the right
will bargain it away to a more efficient producer in exchange for a share of the in-
come that the more efficient producer can achieve. See id.
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banks and evaluates the extent to which the traditional rights-based,
public law approach of the ECOA and the CRA is an adequate mecha-
nism for altering economically rational lending behavior. I do not
claim that laws enacted to regulate the formal market for credit are
wholly ineffective or unnecessary or that public law itself is generally
irrelevant. Part I serves solely to provide a contrast to my main point
in Part III, which illustrates how private law responds to and over-
comes market-based barriers that exist in the formal economy.
Part II studies a parallel sector of community contracts that exists
in immigrant communities. It provides a conceptual framework to ex-
amine the relationship between the open market and the community
market and to distinguish the community market from other types of
markets, such as informal markets. The community market, as I call
it, arises to accommodate and promote certain activities that the open
market cannot. In essence, the question is one of market formation:
where a market for certain exchanges between lenders and marginal
borrowers does not exist in the open market because of high transac-
tion costs, what are the preconditions to the emergence of an alterna-
tive, community market that is better equipped to accommodate such
exchanges?
Part II also draws on norms of solidarity, community, trust, and
other elements central to the communitarian debate and asks how the
customary practices of various ethnic communities provide the requi-
site informational infrastructure, thereby facilitating the emergence
of a market where lenders and borrowers can contract for credit. In
this respect, the community market formed by a community whose
members cannot contract with formal banks on the open market is a
market that combines market principles of allocative efficiency with
community principles of identity and cohesiveness. As Part II main-
Because there is always some transaction cost, the question becomes which insti-
tutional or legal arrangement best minimizes transaction costs. The questions posed
have included the following. First, which governance institution, the state or the mar-
ket, is more efficient for the optimal allocation of economic resources? Second, given
market failures caused by opportunism, asymmetry of information, and other nega-
tive externalities, markets are not always more efficient; under certain circumstances,
government intervention (antitrust laws, for instance) may be necessary to ensure that
markets can indeed function in a way that most closely resembles the classic model.
Third, given the fact that both state and market arrangements suffer from transaction
costs and cannot create perfect competition, what is the second-best choice-public
or private ordering?
Coasian theory of transaction costs has been applied to a variety of institutional
settings. In this Article, I focus on one type of private, informal arrangement-rotat-
ing credit associations and their ability to overcome transaction costs faced by formal
lenders. See infra Part III.B.
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tains, a community market is about community as well as market and
thus illustrates how a community's repository of norms and practices
can lay the foundation for exchanges that value both community
bonds and wealth maximization.
The Article's central points and arguments are in Part III. Here,
I study a host of unorthodox but highly effective arrangements organ-
ized by entities outside the mainstream of conventional banking struc-
tures, for example, immigrants' rotating savings and credit
associations such as the Korean "kye," the Chinese and Vietnamese
"hui," the Japanese "tanamoshi," the Cambodian "thong thing," the
Mexican "cundina," the Ethiopian "ekub," and West Indian "esusu."
Immigrants who have neither the resources nor the credit history de-
manded by banking institutions in the formal economy rely on com-
munity mechanisms by contributing a set amount of money into a
lending circle, which rotates as loans among members on the basis of
need, lottery, or bid. This community-based financial sector, as Part
III argues, maintains its effectiveness through a bottom-up informa-
tion exchange mechanism that lowers the screening, monitoring, en-
forcement, and other transaction costs associated with formal
institutional lending. Part III looks at how rotating credit associations
constitute an instance where communitarian-based norms, which em-
phasize community as opposed to individual commitments, combine
with market behaviors to marshal kinship and ethnic affinities in ways
that both preserve their moral and social bases and further transac-
tions that improve economic efficiency.
The central paradox can be stated as follows: how and why can
marginal borrowers deemed uncreditworthy by a formal financial sec-
tor fully backed by public laws, such as contract and other formal col-
lection procedures, be relied upon to repay loans provided by a
community financial sector ungoverned by any public laws? Part III
examines how norms, social structure, and the production of "social
capital"18 promote economic exchanges without the state's threat of
force or sanction.
18 Robert Putnam has studied how civic organizations strengthen a society's sense
of cooperation, trust, and reciprocity-elements called "social capital"-and how so-
cial capital is crucial for the success of certain political and economic institutions. See
ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WoRic CMc TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY
167 (1993). Different forms of associations and networks are capable of generating
social capital to different degrees. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's De-
clining Social Capital, 6J. DEMOCRACY 65, 76 (1995); see also JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDA-
TIONS OF SocIAL THEORY 302-07 (1990) ("Social capital . . . is created when the
relations among persons change in ways that facilitate action."); id. at 304; FuKUYAMA,
supra note 6, at 26 ("Social capital is a capability that arises from the prevalence of
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From the conclusion drawn in this Article that a community or-
dering of credit associations functions as an alternative to open mar-
ket transactions by providing exchange mechanisms necessary for the
emergence of an alternative market, Part IV moves beyond the 'Juris-
dictional" question' 9-which market, community economy, or open
market economy-and addresses the substantive question of how best
to promote such wealth-enhancing community norms. Part IV asks
how and to what extent public law should define the boundary be-
tween the formal, open market sector and the community-based sec-
tor. First, Part IV argues that where efficient social norms are
produced by private groups, courts faced with adjudicating disputes
among group members who ignore the group's "no judicial recourse"
norm by initiating suit should either dismiss such cases under what I
call a theory of "community nonjusticiability"20 or, in those limited
circumstances where judicial resolution is appropriate, take the case
but resolve such community-based disputes by deferring to existing
group norms.
This proposal is eminently defensible because of the positive in-
centive structure that gives rise to and governs rotating credit associa-
tions. This incentive structure derives from an aggregation of
interests that is particular to rotating credit associations and that also
distinguishes it from other alternative credit institutions, such as loan
sharks. Borrowers and lenders who transact on the open market or
through loan sharks for credit do so as disaggregated entities. By con-
trast, a rotating credit association functions on the basis of aggrega-
tion of interests between borrowers and lenders, precisely because the
lender is the borrower. As a result, the incentive structure is one that
maximizes group and individual welfare while minimizing the possibil-
ity of defection and exploitation, as well as other forms of abuse.
trust in a society or in certain parts of it. It can be embodied in the smallest and most
basic social group, the family as well as the largest of all groups, the nation, and in all
the other groups in between. Social capital differs from other forms of human capital
insofar as it is usually created and transmitted through cultural mechanisms like reli-
gion, tradition, or historical habit.").
19 See Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1747
(1996) (critiquing the overexpenditure of scholarly resources on the question ofjuris-
diction-"which institution-court, legislature, or community-is best able to set
norms"-and proposing that the question be redirected to "what those norms should
be").
20 I thank Professor Viet Dinh for suggesting and coining the term. Community
nonjusticiability means judges faced with a case arising out of a rotating credit associa-
tion dispute would decline to hear the case. See infra notes 228-34 and accompanying
text.
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Second, Part IV studies the linkages that should be promoted be-
tween the two sectors and argues that where conventional banking
arrangements can be modified to incorporate nonlegal norms and
other innovative measures that minimize the costs of lending, such
modifications should be encouraged.
Economists have focused primarily on the notion of rational
choice as the motivating factor for economic behavior-hence the
emphasis on aggregate data such as prices and quantities-and have
excluded from systematic consideration an individual's social interac-
tions and psychological motivations, "especially when moral consider-
ations dominate choice. ' 21 My conclusion, however, is that the notion
of the "rational profit maximizer" is itself contextually or culturally
situated. While the opportunity to contract for credit in the open mar-
ket is limited because a rational cost/benefit analysis on the part of
lenders would lead to a suboptimal availability of credit for certain
borrowers, a different result follows when the parties leave the open
market to establish an alternative market-by contracting back into a
community market of status-based relationships.
In sum, this Article explores how imperfections in the formal
market can be remedied through the establishment of a separate com-
munity market that relies on an infrastructure of community informa-
tion exchange to enable borrowers to contract with lenders with
minimal transaction costs. The Article thus addresses issues of market
imperfections, alternative market formation, and participation in the
social, moral, and civic life of a community. By examining rotating
credit associations, the Article studies an instance in which communi-
tarian practice, which values cooperation and commitment, intersects
with markets, which value wealth maximization and allocative effi-
ciency. My aim is to study how the claims of community are them-
selves intertwined with economic efficiency-in other words, how
social capital may aid in the creation of economic capital.
I. AN INADEQUATE PUBLIC LAW MODEL
A. State Regulation of the Formal Market for Credit
Development economics 22 has recognized, since its inception in
the 1950s, that the essential problem for lesser-developed countries
21 Shira B. Lewin, Economics and Psychology: Lessons for Our Own Day from the Early
Twentieth Century, 34J. EcoN. LIT. 1293, 1293 (1996).
22 The term "development economics" originated with economic historian Alfred
Sauvy. See DIANA HUNT, ECONOMIc THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF COM-
PETING PARADIcMs 80 n.1 (1989). It was established as a subdiscipline of economics
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lies in the vicious cycle of poverty caused by a scarcity of capital and an
inadequate level of savings, which generates a continuing scarcity of
capital and conversely, a continued inability to save and invest.23 Low
wages, caused partially by a large pool of surplus and unskilled labor
in the oversized agrarian sector, impede savings, which in turn im-
pede capital formation, accumulation, and investment.24
A similar problem exists in the economically undeveloped urban
areas of the United States. Those who are poor do not make enough
to save and thus cannot invest in asset accumulation or other econom-
ically productive activities. Hence the quintessential problem: how to
achieve a surplus of capital for those who have no surplus or, where
savings are low, how to induce capital markets to extend credit to
those who have no capital or asset base.2 5 Setting aside the issue of
discrimination, the high risks which banks may incur due to the ab-
sence of capital-and-asset collateral alone can result in patterns of
suboptimal lending referred to by some economists as "rational red-
lining."26 The essential dilemma can be characterized in the follow-
and was designed to address the condition of economic undevelopment of the lesser
developed nations. See id. at 7.
23 See, e.g., RAGNAR NURKSE, PROBLEMS OF CAPITAL FORMATION IN UNDERDEVEL-
OPED COUNTRIES 57 (1953).
24 See W. Arthur Lewis, Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour, in
PARADIGMS IN ECONOMIC DEVELoPMENT 59, 72 (Rajani Kanth ed., 1994) ("The central
problem in the theory of economic development is to understand the process by
which a community which was previously saving and investing 4 or 5 percent of its
national income or less, converts itself into an economy where voluntary saving is
running at about 12 to 15 percent of national income or more.").
25 See Edward L. Hudgins, Why the World Bank Should Read Its Own Repor, HER-
TAGE FOUNDATION REPORTS, Sept. 22, 1989, No. 727. ("The existence of savings and
credit allows households to enjoy the immediate buyouts of various goods and services
by borrowing against future earnings. For businesses, credit is crucial. Short-term
credit is essential for merchants to keep inventories at levels to keep customer de-
mand. Longer term credit is important not only for establishing productive enter-
prises but also for expansion, purchases of new equipment and machinery, research
and development of new products, and modernization of the production process for
maximum efficiency.").
26 The term "redlining" originates from the practice of demarcating certain sus-
pect neighborhoods by the drawing of a red line and refusing to extend loans to those
located within the redlined zones.
"Rational redlining" may be caused by high transaction costs involved in identify-
ing and monitoring certain types of loans which may result in a lender's decision to
exclude certain areas. By contrast, "irrational redlining" refers to redlining resulting
from racial and ethnic discrimination. SeeJACK M. GuTEAG & SUSAN M. WAc-ITER,
REDLINING AND PUBLIC POLICY 13-14 (1980). Even if banks could identify low-risk
from high-risk borrowers who are either uncreditworthy or who lack collateral, the
theory of "rational redining" suggests that "banks may rationally decline to lend in
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ing manner: because those who are poor cannot save enough to
accumulate assets, they have too little to qualify for credit. Given the
prevailing standards of conventional banking practices, even in the
absence of lending discrimination, those who need money the most
are those who can borrow the least.
Since the 1970s and in recent years, especially since the distur-
bances in 1992 in South Central Los Angeles, the availability of credit
has become an issue linked with the economic viability of lower-in-
come communities in the United States.27 Hence, a host of legislative
actions has been pursued to regulate the market for credit and to ad-
dress the concern that the financial industry is engaged in individual
credit discrimination as well as community or geographic redlining.
28
In accordance with the equal opportunity, antidiscrimination norms
of the civil rights era, the ECOA was enacted in 1974 to ensure non-
discrimination, for example, by prohibiting lenders from requesting,
and presumably acting on, improper information concerning certain
characteristics of an applicant in either the application or the evalua-
tion process.
A different strategy was pursued with the passage of the CRA in
1977. Departing from the equality of opportunity, procedural fairness,
and antidiscrimination norms typified by the ECOA, the CRA, passed
as Title VIII of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1977, was
enacted in accordance with the outcome-oriented norms of affirma-
tive action. The prevailing concern behind the CRA is not credit dis-
crimination against individual applicants but rather geographic
redlining and disinvestment.29 Under the CRA, the state adopts reme-
dial action to reverse neighborhood disinvestment by imposing on in-
sured depository institutions the "continuing and affirmative obligation
to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which [they
are] chartered, °30 which includes "low-and moderate-income neigh-
borhoods, consistent with the safe and sound operations of such
institution [s].1"31
low-income neighborhoods, where the costs to a bank of acquiring credit-related in-
formation may well be high and the benefit low." Klausner, supra note 16, at
1567-68; see also GurrENTAG & WACHTER, supra, at 7-12.
27 See Current Status of the Community Reinvestment Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Hous. and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking Hous., and Urban Affairs,
102d Cong. 1-2 (1992) (statement of Sen. Alan Cranston, Chairman, Subcomm. on
Hous. and Urban Affairs).
28 See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
29 See generally Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 298.
30 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(3) (1994).
31 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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Yet as I discuss in the second part of this Section, the underlying
difficulty lies ultimately with a basic dilemma that is essentially unrec-
tifiable by civil rights regulations. Where the market for credit is
marred by market imperfections, law that fails to address the underly-
ing economic reasons that cause suboptimal lending will be only par-
tially effective at altering the lending behaviors of financial
institutions at issue. The high transaction costs banks must incur to
identify sound borrowers among a pool of marginal borrowers have
resulted in the absence of a market for such exchanges among lenders
and borrowers. Neither the ECOA nor the CRA can create a market
when lenders acting pursuant to a rational cost-benefit analysis believe
it to be nonviable.
B. Market Imperfections and Transaction Costs
Given the absence of a ready market for loans between particular
borrowers and lenders, both the ECOA and the CRA, designed to
prod banks into lending when they otherwise would not, can be
viewed essentially as efforts to put into place a market for seemingly
questionable and marginally profitable loans. The CRA, in particular,
pushes banks to reinvest in local communities and extend credit to
borrowers under circumstances that may be directly antithetical to
fundamental economic norms, which may or may not be discrimina-
Federal bank regulations monitor CRA by assigning each bank a CRA rating of
either "outstanding," "satisfactory," "needs to improve," or "substantial compliance."
12 U.S.C. § 2906(b) (2) (1994). A bank that fails in its obligation to meet "the credit
needs of its entire community," § 2903(a) (1) (1994), would be faced with a low CRA
rating. Federal regulators would then be required to take these ratings into consider-
ation when a bank or its holding company applies to acquire deposit facilities, which
may result in delay or outright denial of acquisition, merger, branching, or relocation
requests. See §§ 2902-03. In 1989, pursuant to the Financial Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989, § 1212, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, 527 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2902, 2906 (1994)), amendments to the CRA mandated
public disclosure of and public access to government CRA evaluations, including data
on loans that was either denied or withdrawn. See 12 U.S.C. § 2906.
New regulations emphasize result rather than process, see Community Reinvest-
ment Act Regulations,'60 Fed. Reg. 22,156 (1995), and focus on an actual lending test
(as opposed to the bank's efforts alone) designed to measure the volume as well as
dispersion of a bank's lending activity in low-income neighborhoods in its area of
operation. See 12 C.F.R. § 228.22(a) (1998) (stating that the lending test "evaluates a
bank's record of helping to meet the credit needs of its assessment areas through its
lending activities").
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tory. "[T] he CRA aims to alter a general pattern in the allocation of
credit that does not depend on the presence of discrimination." 32
Indeed, "The objectionable pattern [of suboptimal lending]
could be observed in a market in which there is no discrimination.133
A similar pattern of lending and outward credit flow characterizes the
behavior of minority-owned banks as well. In 1992, for example, two
of the five largest black-owned banks in Chicago received low CRA
ratings of "needs to improve."3 4 While there are reports that the CRA
has resulted in a sharp increase in lending by banks in inner-city ar-
eas,35 many critics charge that much of this lending has been based on
below-market rates and less stringent lending standards, which has
caused some to worry that the default rates for such loans will be rela-
tively high.36 Some, on the other hand, worry that the CRA is not
tough enough and should be revised along yet more radical lines, for
example, "establishing statutory criteria for CRA-approved invest-
ments and.., mandating that a set percentage of the assets or lending
activity of all financial intermediaries be placed in such invest-
ments, '37 or "through direct subsidies to existing banks and through
community group assistance with prescreening, technical support,
and character determination." 38
These proposals attempt to circumvent the undeniably high
transaction costs that conventional financial institutions face when
searching for or responding to lending and investment opportunities
in low-income communities. But if the current market-based frame-
work of conventional banking practices continues to prevail, transac-
tion costs banks face when they make certain types of loans must be
addressed.
32 Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, LendingDiscrimination: Economic Theory,
Econometric Evidence, and the Community Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO. L.J. 237, 250, 253
(1996).
33 See id. ("Conversely, a market in which discrimination is rampant might fail to
generate the pattern that serves as the primary empirical justification for the CRA.").
34 See id. at 254 n.75.
35 See Dennis Hevesi, Giving Credit Where Credit Was Denied, N.Y. TIMES, June 8,
1997, atJl; David Rohde, Banks Discover the South Bronx, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 16, 1997, at
B1.
36 See Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 32, at 245 n.46.
37 Anthony D. Taibi, Banking Finance, and Community Economic Empowerment:
Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Racial Justice, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1507 (1994); see also id. at 1507-08.
38 Id. at 1509; see also Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 32, at 282 ("A subsidy ap-
proach would not eliminate administrative costs. However, it would make them a
matter of choice for lending institutions.").
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Banks typically rely on a number of lending criteria to assess the
costs and the benefits associated with making a particular loan, includ-
ing an applicant's "creditworthiness" and other traditional require-
ments, such as evidence of continuous employment history.39 The
cost-benefit analysis requires the bank to engage in the process of ac-
quiring accurate information about the applicant, the purpose of the
loan, and the location of the project which the loan is expected to
support.
One of the imbalances in a credit relationship is the informa-
tional asymmetry that inherently exists between the borrower and the
lender: the borrower usually has more accurate information about the
borrower's own creditworthiness than does the lender.40 In other
words, even though there may be "honest" and "dishonest" borrow-
ers,4 1 lenders do not always have adequate information to accurately
distinguish one from the other,42 and further, to determine whether
even "honest" borrowers have the necessary resources to repay. To
lower their screening costs, banks use techniques to improve their in-
formation. They attempt to draw inferences about the creditworthi-
ness of a loan applicant by analyzing information accumulated from
similar past loans.43 Information gleaned from such "observationally
distinguishable"44 groups-in other words, differentiation based on
age, occupation, or neighborhood-often leads to a phenomenon re-
ferred to as "credit rationing," in which a lender faced with exorbitant
39 These requirements have been criticized as inherently biased because they
favor "[w]hite only" borrowers and prevent lower-income applicants who may other-
wise be good credit risks from even meeting the threshold standards imposed by fi-
nancial institutions. See Taibi, supra note 37, at 1479; see also Bob Gnazda, Loan
Practice Labeled Discriminatory, SACRAMATENTO OBSERVER, Apr. 29, 1992, at G2.
40 See Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and
Credit Rationing, 90 Q. J. EcoN. 651, 664 (1976).
41 See id. at 651-52 ("Honest borrowers accept only loan contracts that they ex-
pect to repay and under our assumptions, they do in fact repay them. Dishonest
individuals, in contrast, default on loans whenever the costs of default are sufficiently
low. Lenders, however, are unable to distinguish between the two types of individuals
on an a priori basis.").
42 See RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JusTicE 362 (1981) ("In recent
times.., the most important factor responsible for discrimination probably has been
information costs.").
43 In the case of home mortgages, for example, to lower the costs of gathering
information, banks may rely on information already in their possession regarding
prior appraisals of comparable houses. If a certain neighborhood has not had home
sales in recent years, and the market value of comparable houses is not available, the
information costs for lending will increase.
44 Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Infor-
mation, AM. ECON. REV., June 1981, at 393, 406.
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investigative costs excludes certain groups of borrowers from its
threshold analysis.
45
Once lenders engage in credit rationing, the economics of their
cost-benefit analysis may produce the following result. Lenders may
decide that certain categories or subcategories of loan applicants,
based on lenders' prior experiences with similarly situated applicants,
would be a credit risk, and thus applicants from such categories or
subcategories would simply not be given serious, if any, consideration.
The alternative, charging a high interest rate to compensate for the
high possibility of default,46 could result in "adverse selection," that is,
attracting bad borrowers.47 Banks would then prefer to offer a lower
rate and to ration credit instead, resulting in reduced lending and
eventual deterioration in the economic development of certain lower-
income neighborhoods. 48
Besides information costs, banks also face other types of transac-
tion costs-for example, monitoring costs that are incurred in all, but
certainly in marginal, loan transactions. The presence of security be-
hind a debt "enhances the lender's ability to enforce payment.... If
the lender believes when it makes the loan that these advantages in-
crease the likelihood of repayment, the lender can charge less for the
45 See Anjan V. Thakor & Richard Callaway, Costly Information Production Equilibria
in the Bank Credit Market with Applications to Credit Rationing, 18 J. FIN. & QuANTTATIVE
ANALYSIS 229, 245 (1983) ("defining credit rationing" as a process in which certain
types of loan applications are rejected without serious consideration). See generally
DwiGHTr M. JAFFEE, CREDIT RATIONING AND THE COMMERCIAL LOAN MARKET (1971).
46 See Luize E. Zubrow, Rethinking Article 9 Remedies: Economic and Fiduciary Perspec-
tives, 42 UCLA L. REV. 445, 541 (1994) ("[N]either an increase in the interest rate or
the nonprice terms of the loan (including the collateral provided) is likely to induce
the lender to extend credit."); see also Stiglitz & Weiss, supra note 44, at 395-402
(stating that while charging higher interest rates may increase the likelihood that
banks may extend credit to high-risk borrowers, at some point, banks may determine
that higher rates will attract a high-risk applicant pool even more likely to default,
because borrowers who are likely to default will not be deterred by high interest
rates).
4'7 The term "adverse selection" is used primarily in the insurance context, where
it has been noted that "once a firm offers to insure certain risks, parties that are most
likely to suffer a loss will be the first to seek insurance." Hylton & Rougeau, supra
note 32, at 258 n.88.
48 See generally DwightJaffee &Joseph Stiglitz, Credit Rationing, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
MONETARY ECONOMICS 837, 853-60 (Benjamin M. Friedman & Frank H. Hahn eds.,
1990). This assumes, of course, either that banks cannot truly distinguish "honest"
and low-risk borrowers from "dishonest" and high-risk borrowers in certain neighbor-
hoods, or that the costs of information needed to make such distinction is too high to
make such lending financially worthwhile.
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loan, thus lowering the aggregate costs of the transaction."49 The
grant of collateral is especially desirable "for entities that lend to
smaller borrowers for whom there is no practical means of monitoring
compliance" to the terms of the loan.50 Thus, creditors may demand
security as a way of containing high risks of default,51 or as a way of
lowering monitoring costs. 52 Where security or collateral is unavaila-
ble, marginal applicants are likely to be at a disadvantage because the
lack of security will mean increased monitoring costs for lenders, re-
sulting in an increased unwillingness to lend.
Thus lenders performing a rational cost-benefit analysis will likely
decide against lending to borrowers who lack certain indicia of
creditworthiness. The market cannot lower transaction costs that are
themselves caused by econmically rational market behavior. Nor can
the ECOA or the CRA, because neither is designed to address the cost
of lending.
As I demonstrate in Part II, where an imperfect market for cer-
tain exchanges cannot be remedied by a public law model, it can be
supplemented by what I call a "community market" of rotating credit
associations. Embedded within a contextual framework of affinity and
shared community norms, rotating credit associations allow members
who cannot contract in the open market to rely on the norms of com-
munity, lowering the transaction costs of exchanges and building on
the community's social capital to create economic capital for its low-
income members.
II. THE COMMuNrTY MARKET
A. An Economy of Community: The Market Functionality of Community-
Based Lending Circles
It is generally assumed in market economies that markets, not
communities, facilitate economic exchanges. Yet, as I discuss below,
community-based associations such as lending circles can help their
49 RonaldJ. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARv. L. REv. 625,
639 (1997).
50 Id. at 645.
51 See, e.g., JAMES C. VAN HoRNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND PoLIcY 536 (3d ed.
1974) (Marginal firms cannot obtain credit on an unsecured basis .... In order to
make a loan, lenders require security so as to reduce their risk of loss.").
52 It has been suggested that secured financing can be seen as one of the many
methods in which creditors cope with the costs of monitoring. See, e.g., Thomas H.
Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88
YALE LJ. 1143, 1158-61 (1979) (stating that creditors who are inefficient monitors
may take security to reduce monitoring burdens).
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members overcome market imperfections in the larger society. In
other words, certain community norms and behaviors can correct in-
formational asymmetries that are responsible for the high transaction
costs in the open market, thereby creating a community market for
credit where none could exist before.
Sociologists have noted the historical evolution from community
to society.5 3 The former is marked by groups bound by ties of kinship,
ethnic, religious, or other affinities, and the latter by persons who in-
teract on the basis of utilitarian advantage and whose ties with each
other are looser and more contingent than those forged on the basis
of community. Familistic relationships and social associations evoke
community, or "Gemeinschaft," and open contractual relationships
evoke society, or "Gesellschaft."54 This change from community to so-
ciety has been characterized as an evolution from feudalism to mod-
ernism, from exchanges based on status and "natural will" to those
based on contract and "rational will."55
When community played a more significant role in its members'
lives, "[t]he reciprocal ties of social obligation among members of a
community defined standards of behavior."56 For example, strict
codes of conduct were enforced by eleventh-century Jewish traders in
the Mediterranean market by the maintenance of close social ties and
the use of ostracism 57 as a sanctioning device for behavioral
breaches.5 8 The movement away from the binding ties of community,
however, has allowed people to invoke their freedom of contract to
enter "a world of independent actors, each of whom should be al-
lowed to pursue his or her own interests without regard for the inter-
ests of others,"59 limited, of course, by the duty not to inflict harm.
Absent public policy and fraud considerations, modem contract law
facilitates open market transactions by providing for the enforcement
53 See THOMAS BENDER, COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA (1978); ROB-
ERT A. NISBET, THE SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION (1966); FERDINAND T5NNiES, COMMUNITY
AND SOCIETY [GEMEINSCHAFr UND GESELLSCHAFT] (Charles P. Loomis ed. & trans.,
1957).
54 TdNNIES, supra note 53, at 18, 33.
55 HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 99-100 (J.M. Dent & Sons 1917) (1861).
56 Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA. L. REV. 829, 831
(1983).
57 For a discussion of the possible collision between community ostracism and
state law, see infra notes 308-24 and accompanying text.
58 See Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the
Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIsT. 857 (1989); see also Avner Greif, Contract Enforceabil-
ity and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition, 83 AM. ECON.
REV. 525 (1993).
59 Feinman, supra note 56, at 839.
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of exchanges 6° that meet the basic requirements of bargain, and in
the case of Anglo-American law, consideration. 6 1 The enforcement of
such exchanges is premised on the assumption that the development
of an open, transparent market furthers individual freedom of action
and at the same time constitutes the most efficient means of allocating
resources, resulting in the maximization of wealth and utility for both
individuals and society.62 If markets maximize the wealth of society,
they can do so most efficiently because "resources are devoted to their
most advantageous use by individuals acting out of self-interest,"68 or
to put it another way, because individuals are allowed the greatest
freedom to form their own choices and pursue their own self-interests
through arms' length and freely negotiated transactions-without be-
ing unduly bound or constrained by the multiple webs of commit-
ments and corresponding burdens exerted by a collectivity of
premarket ies.
64
Once economic exchanges are made pursuant to rational calcula-
tions rather than kinship or other personalized relationtionships, the
economy can progress into "an increasingly separate, differentiated
sphere in modem society."65 As Adam Smith suggested, perfect com-
petition is conditioned upon social atomization of individuals in their
economic interactions. 66 Presumably, the elimination of messy per-
60 The law of contracts provides the means through which one's contract expecta-
tions will be enforced. No longer must a contracting party rely on nonstate mecha-
nisms, such as ostracism, gossip, accusations of witchcraft, and other forms of
primitive community pressures to produce order. See BRoN*sLAw MALNoWsKI, Cus-
TOM AND CONFLICT IN A SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926).
61 See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACrs §§ 17, 71 (1981); CHARLES FRiED,
CONTRACT As PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBUGATION 7-14 (1981).
62 See generally Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 103, 132 (1979).
63 Feinman, supra note 56, at 840.
64 Indeed, the crisis currently plaguing many Southeast Asian economies may be
located in the overemphasis on long-term, familistic-type relationships among busi-
nesses and banks, so that "[f]irms were insulated from market forces." Frozen Mirack,
A Suruey of East Asian Economies, THE ECONOMIST, March 7, 1998, at 14. "The long-term
relationship between government, banks and firms encouraged cronyism and corrup-
tion." Id.
65 Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embedded-
ness, 91 AM. J. Soc., 481, 482 (1985).
66 SeeADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 232-33 (1776) (Andrew Skinner ed.,
1979); see also 3 THE NEw PALGRAVE: A DICnONARY OF ECONOMICS 334 (John Eatwell et
al. eds., 1987) (describing the Latin American and Caribbean marketplace and noting
that "[a]Ithough competition is usually so pronounced that price-rigging is impracti-
cable, the frequency of 'regular customer' relationships means that it is apt to be
imperfect").
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sonal relations from economic analysis allows transactions to be un-
dertaken primarily on rational and transparent market terms
uncomplicated by noneconomic obligations. The existence of per-
sonal ties or clannishness may impede entrepreneurship, 67 complicate
economic calculations, and present "enhanced opportunity for mal-
feasance"68 if one party manipulates the other's trust for fraudulent
ends.
If the nonformal, nontransparent nature of economic relation-
ships in less developed countries is deemed abnormal, its emergence
and existence in highly developed economies has been viewed as
equally, if not more, problematic. This discomfort has been com-
pounded by the fact that many activities not conducted on the open
market are often summarily presumed to be informal economy activi-
ties-unsavory, parasitic, illegal, exploitative activities.69 But the infor-
mal economy encompasses a wide range of activities. Some activities
are conducted outside the view and reach of the formal economy be-
cause they are criminal activities, for example, loan sharking or drug
dealing. Others "go underground," into the sweatshop industry, for
example, because it allows them to evade and defy occupational
health and safety standards and child labor or other labor-related
laws. 70 There are yet others who favor unrecorded transactions, rang-
ing from informal childcare and housecleaning services to informal
street vending, to evade state licensing, taxes, and other costs of par-
ticipation in the formal economy.
71
67 See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, PEDDLARS AND PRINCES: SOCIAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
MODERNIZATION IN TWO INDONESIAN TowNs 131-32 (1963). Fukuyama has noted that
reliance on clannish or familistic networks is helpful for the success of small busi-
nesses but detrimental to the formation of large businesses that compete nationally or
internationally. FUKUYAMA, supra note 6, at 28-29, 62-67.
68 Granovetter, supra note 65, at 491.
69 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Moral and Practical Dilemmas of an Underground
Economy, 103 YALE LJ. 2157, 2158 (1994); LoraJo Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable
Immigrant Workforce and the Need for Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE
L.J. 2179 (1994).
70 See Jo Foo, supra note 69; Christian Zlolniski, The Informal Economy in an Ad-
vanced Industrialized Society: Mexican Immigrant Labor in Silicon Valley, 103 YALE L.J. 2305,
2321 (1994).
71 See Epstein, supra note 69; Saskia Sassen, The Informal Economy: Between New
Developments and Old Regulations," 103 YALE L.J. 2289, 2294 (1994) (arguing that infor-
mality is a response to several structural shifts in the economy, such as the high costs
of commercial space and other factors of production); see id at 2295 (describing the
expansion of high-income consumers who desire customized goods and services that
cannot be mass produced but rather must be subcontracted out into the informal
economy); see id. at 2296-97 (arguing that the expansion of low-income consumers
provides a niche for low-cost, low-priced goods and services); Paul Schwartzman, Van
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For the purpose of this Article, what is important to note is that
there is a continuum of economic exchanges. Some exchanges are
conducted in the open market, among buyers and sellers or borrowers
and lenders who contract with each other on a relatively unfettered,
arms' length basis, and who subject their transactions to the reach and
scope of laws and regulations ranging from contract and tax laws to
safety, labor, and health standards. Other exchanges are hidden in
the informal economy, either because they violate the criminal laws or
because they seek to evade the state's regulatory or licensing rules. In
the latter category, activities such as informal vending have been de-
fended when viewed in reference to the costs and constraints in the
formal economy72 and the concomitant creation of opportunities for
certain people, such as "'members of discriminated [sic] ethnic and
racial groups [who] tend to be overrepresented as workers in informal
enterprises.... ."73 A plausible argument has been made in defense of
informal vending in Philadelphia and New York by African-American
street vendors who cannot or choose not to comply with the bureau-
cracy and formality of permits and licenses but who perform a valua-
ble service by providing affordable goods for low-income, African-
American consumers. 74
Ban a Bust, DAILY NEws, June 9, 1996, at 27 (describing an efficient "shadow transport
system" of unlicensed vans competing with inefficient city buses and licensed van own-
ers who had to pay an estimated $7,000 for insurance, permits and plates).
72 See Sassen, supra note 71 at 2289 ("[T]he 'informal economy' refers to those
income-generating activities occurring outside the state's regulatory framework that
have analogs within that framework.").
Studies of the formal sector in Peru, for example, have found that where the
establishment of a business entailed compliance with a burdensome, bureaucratic,
and regulatory system of permits and authorizations, ift essence making the conduct
of private business in the formal economy not just costly but also unreasonably time-
consuming and inefficient, a thriving informal economy has emerged. See HERNANDo
DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH 133-46 (1989). De Soto and his group of researchers
found that it took eighty-three months to navigate Peru's regulatory maze to obtain a
license to build housing on unused state-owned land, ten months to acquire a license
costing thirty-two times the monthly minimum wage to start a business, forty-three
days to open a retail store, and seventeen years to open a market.
Informal trade by Peruvian street vendors operating without government permits
provided employment for an estimated 314,000 people and generated sales of $322.2
million per year. See id. at 60. In the same year in which the Peruvian government's
investment in public housing equaled $173.6 million, the value of informal housing
constructed by informal settlers on unused state land totaled $8.32 billion. See id. at
18.
73 George L. Priest, The Ambiguous Moral Foundations of the Underground Economy,
103 YALE L.J. 2259, 2273 (1994) (citation omitted).
74 See Regina Austin, "An Honest Living": Street Vendors, Municipal Regulation, and
the Black Public Sphere, 103 YALE L.J. 2119, 2123 (1994) (Informal street vending by
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Still other types of activities, however, do not fall neatly into
either the formal or informal economies. Seen against this spectrum
of economic activities, rotating credit associations can be viewed as a
particular instance in which community commitment and coopera-
tion intersect with market-enhancing arrangements in a way that re-
sults in the formation of an effective, alternative community
economy.75 Thus, even though rotating credit associations are indeed
"informal" arrangements that exist outside the apparatus of the for-
mal market and state law, they are not similar to many typical, infor-
mal economy activities, for example, those undertaken to hide from
the formal, regulated market. Indeed, a rotating credit association is
a community arrangement that allows members to engage in low-cost
contracting for credit-not to evade the market or to circumvent the
costs of commercial licensing and governmental regulations, but to
correct market failures and hence improve the workings of the
market.
As I showed in Part I, even without possible race- or class-based
discrimination, credit rationing, adverse selection, and other barriers
that have kept banks from lending to low-income borrowers are mar-
ket barriers intrinsic to a market-based, cost-benefit analysis that many
rational lenders would make. The absence of a market for such loans
is not caused by state-imposed barriers or state regulation but by mar-
ket imperfections. 76 In fact, in its effort to create a more viable mar-
ket for such loans, the state has acted-not to remove or loosen state
regulations that may make market entry costly, but to impose state
laws-for example, the CRA-to circumvent market forces and to
prod banks to act in ways that may be contrary to their market-based
analyses.
By contrast, an alternative response, and the one I examine, is
not one that emphasizes state regulation but one that emphasizes
African American vendors "employs people... [and] supplies blacks with the goods
they need and want... [and] contributes to the maintenance of black culture.").
Similarly, because public buses and licensed taxi services in New York City, for
example, under-serve low-income communities in the more inaccessible outer bor-
oughs, a network of unlicensed gypsy cabs or "livery" car services has also emerged. See
Expensive, But They'll Hack It, NEwSDAY, May 11, 1996, at A2; Sharon Otterman, Queens
Hails Gypsy Cabs, NEWSDAY, Sept. 17, 1995, at A56.
75 For an analysis of how rotating credit associations lower transaction costs of
screening, monitoring, and enforcement, see infra Part III.
76 The reverse is true for some informal economy activities, such as the operation
of sweatshops in the garment industry. There, the animating principle is not market
enhancing but market avoiding. A sweatshop operator goes underground not be-
cause of market barriers but because of state regulation and the costs of compliance
with, for example, licensing, tax, and labor requirements.
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community market formation. Rotating credit associations, which
consist of borrowers who would most likely be considered un-
creditworthy by banks, must be seen as the consumer's or the borrower's
solution to market imperfections, a consumer-driven arrangement that
is a solution to an inherent market deficiency soluble neither by state
regulation nor by open market arrangements. In this instance, the
constitutive element of a community market, then, is a market-creat-
ing, not a market-evading, spirit combined with the reliance on com-
munity to improve market efficiency. Rather than muddling
economic rationality or furthering unrestrained self-dealings, in some
instances community has an efficiency and wealth-producing effect,
especially, as I discuss below, if community economic exchanges are
governed by norms that encourage cooperation and deter opportunis-
tic behaviors.
B. Norms of Community
Because community contracts are often informal and exist
outside the framework of both the formal market and public law, they
call into question traditional thinking about markets law in general
and economic law in particular, for instance, the relationship between
top-down law enacted by the state and decentralized, bottom-up law
that emerges from private or community groups. My discussion of
community norms in this Section illustrates the extent to which norms
can guide the behaviors and expectations of community members,
and in this case, provide an ordered framework in which community
institutions such as rotating credit associations can regulate member
activities without resorting to state law.
Before discussing norms and their capacity to guide social and
economic exchanges, I should state at the outset that this is a highly
contested area of scholarship. The conception of norms and the em-
phasis on a nonlegal order as a possible alternative to state regulation
have made the debate about the nature and relevance of norms a vola-
tile and political one. As one author has noted, "[T]he rhetoric of
'norms' has served a... -dare one say more overfly political?-func-
tion .... Norms help to assure the conservative or anti-collectivists
that the limited laissez-faire approach of an austere common law re-
gime can achieve the proverbial best of both worlds"77-decentralized
decisionmaking plus order-in which case one might conclude that
market failures need not be corrected through legal regulation but
possibly through an alternative, nonlaw, norm-based system. Conse-
77 David Charny, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: "Norms" in Contractual Relation-
ships, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1841, 1844 (1996).
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quently, given this considerable degree of controversy, 78 and given my
argument that some decentralized community groups such as rotating
credit associations are capable of maintaining order precisely because
of the influence norms exert on community members in their social
and economic exchanges, I will be discussing the concept of norms
and its relationship to social order in some detail.
For decades, sociologists have employed the concept of social
norms79 to examine how social meanings are created 8° and how a con-
textual background of thought, understanding, and expectation influ-
ences and shapes individual behavior. Generally speaking, these
scholars refer to patterns of informal but repeated and obligatory8'
practices and understandings as norms rather than legal rules,8 2 in
78 Robert Ellickson called the claim that norms override law "legal peripheralism"
and conversely, the claim that law overrides norms "legal centralism." See ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 137-55 (1991).
79 See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE (Karen E.
Fields trans., The Free Press 1995); TALco-rr PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (1912);
MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 27 (Talcott Par-
sons trans., Scribner 1958); Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary
Statement, 25 AM. Soc. REv. 161 (1960).
80 See DAVID I. KERTZER, RITUAL, POLITICS AND POWER 3-4 (1988) ("Human reality
is not provided at birth by the physical universe, but rather must be fashioned by
individuals out of the culture into which they are born and the experiences they have,
experiences that bring them into contact with other people and with various parts of
nature."). For other works that study the construction of social meaning, see, for
example, PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REAL-
=T": A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UN-
GER, SOCIAL THEORY- ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK 1 (1987) ("[S]ociety is made and
imagined... [to be] a human artifact rather than the expression of an underlying
natural order."); PIERRE BOURDIEU, SYSTEMS OF EDUCATION AND SYSTEMS OF THOUGHT,
in READINGS IN THE THEORY OF EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS 159, 161 (Earl Hopper ed.,
1971) (describing certain experiments that powerfully demonstrate the concept of
social construction).
81 The fact that a practice is regular and repeated does not alone make it a norm.
To qualify as a norm, the practice must also be undertaken with a sense of obligation.
"[M] en take off their hats when they enter a furnace room or a church. Taking off
your hat to escape the heat is different from taking off your hat to satisfy an obliga-
tion. The former is a regularity and the latter is a norm." Cooter, supra note 2, at
1656.
82 However, Professor William Jones uses a broader definition of norms. Norms:
encompass all rules and standards, without regard to their origins or means
of enforcement. The legal system provides important norms and usually
stipulates sanctions for deviant behavior. But social norms also may be the
product of custom and usage, organizational affiliations, consensual under-
takings and individual conscience. The essential feature is that norms con-
strain one person's conduct in deference to the interests of others.
William K. Jones, A Theory of Social Norms, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 545 (1994).
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the sense that norms are nonlegal obligations enforced by something
other than legal or governmental sanctions. A norm "tells people
more than what they must do, under pain of compulsion; it tells them
in a sense what they also 'ought' to do. '83 More recently, economists
have also begun to study the origin and function of norms.8 4 While
neoclassical economics focuses on price or quantity,85 a developing
literature known as "new institutional economics"86 explores norms
83 GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, IAw, NORMS AND AUTHOrrv 2 (1982).
84 See, e.g., GARY S. BECHER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES, 225-30 (1996); George A.
Akerlof, A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May Be One Consequence, 94 Q.
J. EcoN. 749 (1980); Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, An Economist's Perspective on the
Evolution of Norms, 150J. INST. & THEoa TccL ECON. 45 (1994); Kaushik Basu, The
Role of Norms and Law in Economics: An Essay on Political Economy, Paper
Presented at the Conference 25 Years: Social Science & Social Change, Institute for
Advanced Study, Princeton (May 9-11, 1997).
85 Traditionally, neoclassical theories of exchange had empounded that price
considerations outweigh other considerations in economic transactions. See, e.g., Axel
Leijonhufvud, Schoo4 Revolution, and Research Programmers in Economic Theory, in METH-
ODS AND APPRAISAL IN ECONOMICS (Spiro J. Latsis ed., 1976), cited inJANET TMA LANDA,
TRUST, ETHNIcITY, AND IDENTIY 6 (1994) ("[T]ransactors interact in markets on the
basis of most favorable price and in so doing, ignore relationship of status, kinship,
caste, and so on.").
86 See Kaushik Basu et al., The Growth and Decay of Custom: The Role of the New
Institutional Economics in Economic History, 24 ExPLoRAIONS IN ECON. Hisr. 1 (1987).
These economists are now attempting to understand a custom's origin and its persis-
tence. The term "new institutional economics" was originated by Oliver Williamson
in a landmark book, MARKETS AND HIERRCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLIcA-
TIONS (1975).
New institutional economics is closely associated with Ronald Coase's concept of
transaction cost economics, see supra note 17, and is premised on the contention that
most economic actors are not isolated individuals but rather members of organiza-
tions, groups, or institutions, whose behaviors and motivations are influenced by their
social and institutional settings. It emphasizes transaction costs, rather than produc-
tion costs as used in neoclassical economics, and its focus is on the transaction.
Briefly, new institutional economics recognizes that transactions are not cost-free and
that economic actors incur extensive costs before and during the performance of the
contractual or transactional agreements: information costs about the assets to be sold
or bought in the transaction, risk allocation and opportunity costs if the transaction is
not completed, monitoring and other precautions to be undertaken in the event
other players defect or engage in opportunistic behaviors, and enforcement costs
should the other party breach.
Given the existence of transaction costs, the type of institutional arrangements or
governance structure entered into and adopted by the parties, given under their cir-
cumstances, will play a part in determining the overall cost and benefit associated with
the transaction. See OuvER E. WILLAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITAL-
ISM 15-42 (1985). Within this institutional setting, rational decisionmaking and insti-
tutional action will also be influenced by how and to what extent the institution is
capable of disseminating the necessary information to the relevant actors. See
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and institutions and their origin and evolution. This new literature
explores an area that is often ignored in the neoclassical model. The
neoclassical model, which assumes that efficiency derives from perfect
competition, also assumes that inefficient institutions will die out be-
cause rational individual actors will not favor inefficient choices. Yet
some choices are typically beyond the realm of options available to
individuals. "[I] ndividuals choose in the marketplace, in shops, in la-
bor markets. They do not choose between institutions, customs and
social norms. These evolve in response to a multitude of individual
decisions spread over different domains and large stretches of time."
8 7
Hence the emphasis among institutional economists on the origin
and evolution of institutions, customs, and social norms. "Social
meanings act to induce actions in accordance with social norms, and
thereby impose costs on efforts to transform social norms"88 because
they "bring along with themselves the very mechanisms necessary to
preserve their dominance."89 Thus, norms are often powerful enough
to cause people to act, not merely out of habit, but out of a sense of
obligation, in accordance with, rather than in contravention of, estab-
lished norms. Although formal rules structure societal choices and
behavior, "the governing structure is overwhelmingly defined by codes
of conduct, norms of behavior, and conventions." 90
Using the works of sociologists and institutional economists who
have studied the concept of social norms, legal scholars have also ex-
plored the function of norms and the interaction of law and norms,
formal and informal rules. From this burgeoning literature, we know
that sometimes norms may exert a stronger influence on certain be-
haviors than legal rules. Robert Ellickson, for example, found that the
formal rules that governed different property regimes in Shasta
County had little effect on the way neighboring ranchers resolved dis-
putes because the prevailing norms that existed governed their behav-
DoucLAss C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INsTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORM-
ANCE 22-23 (1990). Additionally, new institutional economics also explores how
norms develop and operate within the institution and how various norms-for exam-
ple, norms of cooperation-influence the institutional environment, the firm's inter-
nal structure, and consequently its economic decisionmaking. See also WILLIAMSON,
supra, at 1-8 (discussing the development of the field of new institutional
economics).
87 Basu et al., supra note 86, at 9.
88 Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CH. L. REv. 943, 998
(1995).
89 Id. at 999.
90 NORTH, supra note 86, at 36. See generally EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMER-
GENCE OF NoRMs (1977).
[VOL- 74:3
LOOKING AT COMMUNITIES AND MARKETS
ior regardless of the legal rule in effect.9 1 At other times, legal rules,
rather than being more or less peripheral, may have a significant ef-
fect on norms, either by furthering or impeding a particular norm.
9 2
Norms and their relationship to law have thus been studied and
the fruits of study applied to a wide variety of contexts, 93 ranging from
dueling94 and beekeeping 95 to sumo wrestling in Japan.9 6 Addition-
ally, as this extensive literature demonstrates, norms may emerge from
centralized and organized private agencies, for example, the Ameri-
can grain industry or the Japanese products liability system.97 The lat-
91 See ELLICKSON, supra note 78.
92 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021
(1996) ("Law might attempt to express ajudgment about the underlying activity in
such a way as to alter social norms.... Through time, place, and manner restrictions
or flat bans, for example, the law might attempt to portray behavior like smoking,
using drugs, or engaging in unsafe sex as a sign of individual weakness."); Richard H.
McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race
Discrimination, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1003, 1065-85 (1995) (discussing how the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 facilitated the erosion of the social norm that kept
white business owners from serving or hiring blacks for fear of social stigma, since
white business owners who now hire or serve blacks could be doing so because dis-
crimination is illegal).
At the same time, however, while legal rules certainly influence the construction
of social reality, their influence is often limited. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law:
Toward a Sociology of theJuridical Field, 38 HAsTINGs L.J. 805, 840 (1987) ("There is no
doubt that the law possess a specific efficacy.... Nevertheless, this efficacy, defined by
its opposition both to pure and simple impotence and to effectiveness based only on
naked force, is exercised only to the extent that the law is socially recognized and
meets with agreement, even if only tacit and partial. .. ").
93 See generally Symposium, Law, Economics, and Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643
(1996).
94 See Lessig, supra note 88, at 968-72, 1019-25. Lessig describes how the law
banning dueling in the American South failed "in part because it directly challenges
the norms of loyalty built within the social structure, and these norms can be quite
strong." Id. at 971. See also Warren F. Schwartz et al., The Duel: Can These Gentlemen Be
Acting Efficiently, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 335 (1984).
95 See Steven N. S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16J.L. &
EcoN. 11 (1973). Cheung described the informally enforced norm among apple
orchard owners regarding beekeeping in rural Washington. Given the fact that bees
fly from one orchard to another and pollinate trees on neighboring orchards, it
might make sense for each orchard owner to rely in part on bees from other orchards
to pollinate trees on his own orchard. However, if everyone were to keep fewer bees
than is needed to pollinate his own orchard, relying instead on bees from neighbor-
ing orchards, there would be an overall shortage-hence the norm that obligates eve-
ryone to keep his proportionate share of bees during the pollination period.
96 See Mark D. West, Legal Rules and Social Norms in Japan's Secret World of Sumo, 26
J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1997).
97 It should be noted that nonlegal obligations may be created by centralized or
decentralized groups. As David Charny pointed out, the term "norms" has been used
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ter constitutes a particular type of "nonlegal governance regime... in
which the parties devise a fairly comprehensive system that includes
written rules of conduct, sanctions, and procedures for enforce-
ment."98 On the other hand, norms may also emerge from relatively
informal private groups, for example, "spontaneously" as a result of
interactions among ranchers in rural California or, as is more relevant
to this Article, among members of closely knit and ethnically homoge-
neous groups. Without the state to act as mediator of formal rights
and duties, a community-based market depends not on the establish-
ment of a fixed legal rule but on the existence of guiding principles
and norms. Repeated interactions over time among members of a
community, such as those of rotating credit associations, produce
norms and customs that coordinate community behavior and main-
tain community order without resorting to law.99
Repeated, enduring exchanges among groups or networks are
also likely to produce a commitment toward norms of reciprocity,
as much "for comprehensive and relatively complex regimes as for more informal and
diffuse sanctioning systems." Charny, supra note 77, at 1845. Ellickson's work on
ranching norms in Shasta County, California, describe highly informal norms that
emerge in a highly informal context outside the framework of any formal or central-
ized, albeit private, organization. See ELLICKSON, supra note 78; Robert Ellickson, Of
Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REv.
623 (1986).
By contrast, norms or nonlegal obligations addressed by other scholars are much
less informal and much less "spontaneous" because they are obligations produced
and enforced by highly ordered private organizations. Norms that govern the dia-
mond bourse, for example, a relatively centralized private organization, are them-
selves relatively formal ones with written rules. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the
Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industy, 21 J. LEGAL STUD.
115 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, Opting Out]. So are product liability norms that
govern Japan's Product Safety Council, termed "strict liability by private ordering," as
discussed in J. Mark Ramseyer, Products Liability Through Private Ordering: Notes on a
Japanese Experiment, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1823 (1996). Another example is the set
of business norms enforced by the American grain industry, the National Grain and
Feed Association, as described in Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court:
Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765 (1996)
[hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant Law].
98 Charny, supra note 77, at 1841.
99 Custom emerges from community practice and is not "made" by decree, stat-
ute, or regulation. H.L.A. Hart noted that because custom evolves from practice and
does not contain an established procedure for change or reform, its evolution may be
frustrated in certain instances. See HART, supra note 2, at 90-91 (1961). For a discus-
sion of the concept of norms as not simply regularities or inclinations but rather also
obligations, see infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
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high levels of trust, and intragroup cooperation. 100 Enduring rela-
tionships, whether in the context of network forms of organization' 0'
or homogeneous communities with a history of common cultural ties,
are more likely to use "voice" and coordination rather than "exit" or
"tit for tat" behavior to resolve disputes. 10 2 In such communities,
where members are "repeat players," "[t]here is therefor a constant
incentive shared by all parties to get the rule right. But there is only a
short-term interest of one party to get it wrong, and even that tempta-
tion will not dominate his conduct if his private, long-term losses out-
weigh these short-term gains."'03 Norms of cooperation which
generally promote investment might emerge in the following way. In
an "agency game," in which the player who makes the first move-the
principal-decides whether to invest or not invest, the player who
makes the second move-the agent-has the choice of either cooper-
ating and investing or appropriating and defecting-in other words,
stealing the principal's investment.10 4 With the agent's possible defec-
tion looming in the background, the principal may decide not to in-
vest, causing both parties to lose out on a potentially productive and
mutually beneficial transaction. By contrast, if the game is repeated
and norms of cooperation are produced or maintained, a different
result follows.
[E]very agent has an incentive to provide signals that induce princi-
pals to invest. Every agent will signal "cooperation," regardless of
whether his real strategy is cooperation or appropriation. Conse-
100 See Mark Granovetter, Coase Revisited: Business Groups in the Modern Economy, 4
INDUSTRIAL & CORP. CHANGE 93-131 (1995). In his analysis of business groups, Pro-
fessor Granovetter argued that one distinctive characteristic of such groups is their
"moral community" in which trustworthiness is expected and opportunism deterred.
See also ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 12-14 (1984) (using
economic analysis of social norms to explain how efficient solutions can be struck
when a game is repeated between the same players); Mc:HAEL TAYLOR, CoMMUNrIY,
ANARCHY AND LIBERTY 65-90 (1982) (arguing that community is necessary for the
emergence of a stateless order); ULLMANN-MARGALrr, supra note 90, at 76 (describing
the types of social interaction in which norms emerge and how norms of small groups
or communities make coordination possible); Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, The
Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information, 54
ECONOMETXmcA 533, 533-36 (1986) (describing inefficient solutions in one-shot
games versus efficient solutions in repeated games);Joel M. Podolny & Karen L. Page,
Network Forms of Organization (unpublished paper, Graduate School of Business,
Stanford University).
101 See, e.g., Podolny & Page, supra note 100.
102 See id. at 5; Cooter, supra note 2, at 1658-59.
103 Richard A. Epstein, The Path to T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in
the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12 (1992).
104 See Cooter, supra note 2, at 1657-77.
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quently, a consensus will arise in the community about how agents
ought to act. Such a consensus will convince some members of the
community to internalize the norm and to ingrain it in the young.
Thus a new norm will emerge in the community.
1 0 5
According to scholars who have studied the influence of norms,
norms can be powerful because they guide behavior, not by reference
to external rules, but by invoking an internalized sense of obliga-
tion 0 6 and providing a system of enforcement to ensure against non-
compliance. Thus, norms are more than simply established routine,
habit, or regularities. In other words, norms "are expectations about
action-one's own action, that of others, or both-which express
what action is right or what action is wrong. ' 10 7 Individuals who have
internalized a norm suffer a psychological penalty-guilt or remorse,
for instance-if they fail to abide by the norm, whether or not non-
compliance would be detected by others.10 8 There is also a "psychic/
105 Id. at 1666.
106 See generally GEORGE H. VON WRIGHT, NORm AND ACTION: A LOGICAL INQUIRY
70-92 (1963); Cooter, supra note 2, at 1656. See also BECKER, supra note 84, at 225
("Norms are those common values of a group which influence an individual's behav-
ior through being internalized as preferences."). Psychologists have long studied the
internalization of obligations and the influence of social and cultural norms on be-
havior. See, e.g., JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (Marjorie Gabain
trans., 1965); Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and
the Idea of Justice, in I ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT 1, 409-12 (1981); Lawrence
Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization, in
HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 84, 97-100 (David A. Goslin ed.,
1969). For sources on the process of socializing children into internalizing society's
cultural norms, see Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 380 n.148 (1997).
107 James C. Coleman, Norms as Social Capita4 in ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM: THE Eco-
NOMIC METHOD APPLIED OUTSIDE THE FIELD OF ECONOMICS 135 (Gerhard Radnitzky &
Peter Bernholtz eds., 1987). "A norm may prescribe certain actions such as the norm
that an athlete on a team should play his best. Or it may proscribe certain actions,
such as the norm among observantJews and Muslims of not eating pork, or the norm
once held among observant Catholics of not eating meat on Friday." Id. at 135.
108 See Cooter, supra note 2, at 1662-63 ("[I] nternalization ... can tip the individ-
ual's motivational balance .... From this perspective, internalization attaches a 'guilty
penalty' to violating a norm, which can change the sign of the net psychological bene-
fits."); Robert D. Cooter, Law and Unified Social Theory, 22 J.L. & Soc'y. 50 (1995);
Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of
Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 45-46 (1989). For a different
conception of the relationship between internalization of norms and compliance of
norms-one based not on the psychological cost of guilt or unpleasantness attached
to breaching an internalized norm-see THOMAS NAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM
79-89 (1970) (emphasizing an internalized perception of correctness of behavior
rather than the desire to avoid guilt).
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social"'1 9 bond that is derived from the members' internalization of
community norms, so that one who breaches this bond may experi-
ence "'loss of opportunities for important or pleasurable association
with others, loss of self-esteem, feelings of guilt, or an unfulfilled de-
sire to think of himself as trustworthy and competent."'110
However, even where a norm exists but has not been internalized
by community members because, for example, "the obligation is
vaguely defined, what counts as a violation may depend on what
others think is a violation,"' not necessarily on one's own internaliza-
tion of the obligation. In this case, when a norm is not internalized in
a way that may cause a norm violator to suffer internal psychological
costs such as guilt, external but nonlegal enforcement sanctions-and
relatively low-cost ones at that-may still exist. "Nonlegal enforce-
ment sytems come in many varieties. The ordinary rules of everyday
conduct are enforced by the gossip of neighbors" 2 and the scolding
of friends; at the other extreme of complexity, investors may comply
with intricate financial arrangements mainly to preserve their market
reputation, rather than from fear of lawsuit."" 3
In certain communities, especially those that are closely knit, geo-
graphically concentrated, and relatively homogeneous, each member
has a reputation that is easily known to other members of the commu-
nity, and this "reputational bond"" 4 maximizes both the individual's
compliance with established community norms and the community's
enforcement of its shared norms against rule breakers. In closely knit
communities especially, a member's act will carry social meanings that
are of particular significance to other members of the same commu-
nity. Every act "conveys in its particular context an easily recognized
109 Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 97, at 139.
110 Id. (quoting David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104
HARv. L. REV. 393 (1990)).
111 McAdams, supra note 106, at 385.
112 See Philip Pettit, Virtus Normativa: Rational Choice Perspectives, 100 ETHICS 725
(1990). Enforcement of group norms and sanctioning wrongdoers can be done
through gossip. It is assumed under this theory that people are moved by a concern
that others not think negatively of them. In this way, it is similar to what has been
called the "esteem theory of norms," see McAdams, supra note 106, at 377, that norms
are complied with because noncompliance will result in the withholding of esteem by
others. According to Pettit, gossip works to sanction perceived wrongdoers because
"people do not have to discipline violators intentionally, going out of their way for
example to rebuke them or report them to others; they just have to disapprove of
them-whether that attitude ever issues in intentional activity." Id. at 739.
113 Charny, supra note 77, at 1841.
114 See Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 97, at 116.
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meaning,"115 which is itself contingent "on a particular society or
group or community within which social meanings occur." 16 Thus, a
passenger who buckles her seatbelt in a taxi in Budapest signals "in-
sult" to the driver. 117 A handshake among diamond buyers and sellers
in the Orthodox Jewish community may signal "offer and accept-
ance.""18 Similarly, an oral agreement and a handshake 1 9 may mean
agreement to participate in a community rotating credit association
that includes consent to the association's informal rules-that one
who has collected her share from the association is obligated to pay
the amount back by continuing to deposit her contribution until every
other member of the association has had a chance to collect.
120
If a person acts in a way that is contrary to the community's
norms, "[that] action creates a stigma [and] that stigma [has] a social
meaning"' 21 which may have a negative impact on the violator's repu-
tation. Others in the community may respond by withholding their
esteem as a means of externally sanctioning the norm violator,
1 2 2
which may result in loss of future business with other members of the
business group, reputational injury, ostracism, and banishment from
the community. 123 When disputes do arise, they are almost exclusively
115 Lessig, supra note 88, at 954.
116 Id. at 952.
117 See id.
118 See infra note 180.
119 Jim Szymanski &Jaymes Song, Trust is the Key to "Kye"Investment, TACOMA NEWS
TIaB., June 16, 1996, at DI.
120 See infra Part III.
121 Lessig, supra note 88, at 951.
122 This is what Richard McAdams calls the "esteem theory." See McAdams, supra
note 106, at 377. McAdams examines the "power of esteem sanctions" and discusses
what he calls the "feedback effect," in which "[p]eople competing to be 'well thought
of' compared to others discover that the cost of their noncompliance-the status loss
from deviance-increases as compliance increases." Id. at 365-66. For a discussion of
the importance of peer disapproval to deterrence, see id. at 368 n.114. See a/soJones,
supra note 82, at 566-67 ("IT] he individual's concern about her standing among her
peers is the means by which the group's norms are enforced. The ultimate sanction
for deviance is expulsion, but the simple wish to be well regarded by other members
of the group may assure conformity."); Pettit, supra note 112, at 739-40 ("[Pleople
are moved in great part, though not exclusively, by a concern that others not think
badly of them and, if possible, that they think well of them.").
123 See McAdams, supra note 106, at 380 n.144, for sources cited therein which
distinguish, from among nonlegal sanctions, fear of disapproval and internalized
norms.
Social norms, however, would not be effective as a means of ordering the behav-
ior of people who prefer defiance to conformity and thrive on incurring social disap-
provals by breaching established norms. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social
Roes, 96 COLuM. L. REV. 903, 918 (1996).
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resolved by relying on and applying community norms-"an elabo-
rate, internal set of rules, complete with distinctive institutions and
sanctions" 24 consisting of trade custom and usage and Jewish law
outside the realm of "state-created law."'
125
By contrast, conduct that conforms to the norm of the commu-
nity or a business sector is more likely to bestow a range of benefits-
reputational enhancement, social approval, increased standing in the
community-than conduct that does not. Dealers in the primarily Or-
thodox Jewish diamond industry in New York City, for example, con-
duct their business without the expense of formal contracts by relying
on each others' reputation bonds. Because "the value of an individ-
ual's reputation is a function of the degree to which he possesses
those attributes that other dealers consider important in business rela-
tionships,"126 reputation has a market value.
At least two factors that I have explored above deserve further
emphasis. The ability of private groups to enter into economically ef-
ficient and mutually beneficial relations is influenced as much by an
institutional setting of common background norms as by the fact that
their members interact with each other repeatedly. Where businesses
conduct their activities in accordance with an established and system-
atic panoply of community norms, to the extent that the norms are
desirable from a societal perspective, the activities are essentially self-
regulated and "frictionless" in the sense that adherence to them does
not require the imposition of additional rules to ensure compliance.
In the absence of perfect information, the configuration of nonprice
mechanisms generated by individual internalization of community
norms-the "ought" and the "should," notions of obligation and trust,
for example-constitutes one of the key factors that can promote reci-
procity and cooperation, facilitate the process of economic exchange,
and minimize transaction costs.
Additionally, "Members of a close-knit group develop and main-
tain norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare
that members obtain in their workaday affairs with one another." 27
In agency language, the emergence and acceptance of a business
norm among repeat players will encourage principals to invest if they
believe that their agents subscribe to the norm of cooperation rather
than appropriation, or that those who appropriate will be subject to
community sanctions, which will in turn create an increase in the
124 Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 97, at 115.
125 Id.
126 IM
127 ELuCKSON, supra note 78, at 167.
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levels of production and investment. 128 Thus, mutuality of interests
and repeat play are important factors that will help tip the scale in
favor of cooperation and away from defection, and as I demonstrate
below, help explain why the norms that govern rotating credit associa-
tions are capable of providing an effective, private ordering of com-
munity market outside the realm of state law.
III. ROTATING CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS AND THE LOGIC OF
SOCIAL CAPITAL
A. The Mechanics of Rotating Credit Associations
Simply defined, a rotating credit association is "a group who pool
their funds on a regular basis then rotate the pool around the group
until all members have received it,"129 essentially functioning as both a
savings and lending device. The rotating credit association is known
by a variety of ethnic names-the "kye" in the Korean community, the
"ekub" in the Ethiopian community, the "esusu" in the West Indies
community, the "tanamoshi" in the Japanese community, the "hui" in
the Chinese or Vietnamese, community, the "thong thing" in the
Cambodian community, and the "cundina" in the Mexican commu-
nity.130 While businesses have fled inner-city communities in recent
years, "a new ethnic mercantile class" has moved in.131 The economic
128 See Cooter, supra note 2, at 1666-69.
129 See IVAN LIGHT & EDNA BONACICH, IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS: KOREANS IN Los
ANGELES 1965-1982, at 244 (1988); see also IVAN H. LIGHT, ETHNIC ENTERPRISE IN
AMERICA 23 (1972) (defining a rotating credit association as "'an association formed
upon a core of participants who agree to make regular contributions to a fund which
is given, in whole or in part, to each contributor in rotation'") (quoting Shirley
Ardener, The Comparative Study of Rotating Credit Associations, 94 J. OF THE ROYAL AN-
THROPOLOGICAL INST. 201, 201 (1964)).
130 See Chris Woodyard, Roadside Revival by the Patels, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 1995, at
Al (describing Indian businesses and Indian credit associations); Lena H. Sun, Tradi-
tional Money Pools Buoy Immigrants' Hopes, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1995, at Al (stating
that Bolivian associations are called "pasanaqu"); David J. Jefferson, Neighborhood Fi-
nancing: Lending Clubs Offer Social Support and Quick Capital to Asian Immigrants, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 24, 1989, at R13 (describing the Chinese "hui," the Japanese "tanomoshi,"
the Vietnamese "hoi," and the Korean "kye"); John Flinn, Success the Old-Fashioned
Way, S.F. EXAMINER, April 30, 1995, at DI (describing the Cambodian "thong thing,"
used by the Cambodian community to finance Cambodian doughnut shops); Stephen
Magagnini, Tong Ting: Ancient Financing Tactic Finds New Uses, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct.
16, 1993, at BI (describing the Cambodian tong ting and the Mexican cundina,
among others); Jamaican Emigres Bring Thrift Clubs to New York, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
1988, at A34. (describing Jamaican and other Carribean credit associations).
131 See, e.g., Pauline Yoshihashi & Sarah Lubman, American Dreams: How the Byung
Kim Family of Los Angeles and Other Koreans Have Made It in the U.S., WALL ST. J., June
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basis for many of these businesses is often found in the ethnic institu-
tions and resources of the community, and newcomers with no credit
history have resorted to the community credit market to finance their
businesses.'
3 2
By participating in a rotating credit association, every member,
except the very last member to draw from the pool, can access a lump
sum of capital that she would not have been able to access but for the
association. For example, assume that a credit pool consists of
$50,000 and ten members, each of whom needs $50,000 to start a busi-
ness, and that each member is able to save $5,000 per year. At that
rate, unless a commercial bank loan is available, it would take ten
years for each member to accumulate enough capital to start a busi-
ness. By contrast, it would only take one year for the members to-
gether, through a rotating credit association, to raise $50,000 for one
loan, resulting in an efficiency gain and a decrease in opportunity
costs.
Rotating credit associations have existed in many cultures and
originated hundred of years ago to enable members to pool their cash
to finance businesses, burials, marriages, and other family and social
obligations.' 33 The Korean system, for example, dates back to Korean
16, 1992, at Al; Sandra Sugawara & Elizabeth Tucker, New Firms Backed by Family,
Friends, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1987, at Al (noting that in the Washington D.C. area
there are approximately 2,300 Hispanic-owned businesses, 300 owned by Indo-Chi-
nese, 2,000 by Koreans, 500 by Chinese, and 85 to 100 owned by Ethiopians); Matthew
Schifrin, Horatio Alger Kim, FORBES, Oct. 17, 1988, at 92 (noting that in New York,
Koreans own 85% of the retail green-grocery business, and in the poorer sections of
Atlanta, Georgia, Washington D.C., Oakland, California, Newark, NewJersey, Harlem,
the South Bronx of New York, and the South Side of Chicago, Koreans dominate the
inner city green-grocery business); Jefferson, supra note 130, at R13 (discussing the
role of immigrant credit associations in the revitalization of the Los Angeles metro-
politan area by Chinese immigrants, New York City neighborhoods by Koreans, and
Westminster, California by Vietnamese); Mark Arax, Pooled Cash of Loan Clubs Key to
Asian Immigrant Entrepreneurs, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1988, § 2, at 1 (explaining that
pooled cash from loan associations are financing businesses in Chinatown,
Koreatown, and the Vietnamese business areas of the San Gabriel Valley and Orange
County, California).
132 See LIGHT & BONACICH, supra note 129, at 261 ("Institutional lenders in the
United States have never been satisfactory sources of capital for new small busi-
nesses.... Even the Bank of America acknowledged that 'small or embryonic compa-
nies' were 'at the bottom of the financing totem pole' because banks preferred to
lend to the 'big boys.'").
133 See Christine Gorman, Do-It-Yourself Financing, TIME, July,25, 1988, at 62. Be-
cause rotating credit associations were first observed in less developed economies, it
was assumed that they were inefficient precursors to full-fledged banks and that with
economic development, they would be replaced by more sophisticated financial insti-
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farming villages in the sixteenth century.1 3 4 Similarly, the Chinese
hui, which originated in southern China and is founded on kinship, is
organized by people who come from the same village, lineage, or
clan. 13 5 The Japanese system, by contrast, is not based on kinship and
allows unrelated people from the same district or prefecture in Japan
to participate in the association. 136 The West African esusu has long
historical roots as well. It was particularly prevalent in the southeast-
ern part of Nigeria, and English-language references to it were made
as early as 1794.137
Regardless of cultural origin, rotating credit associations share
common features. They are designed to serve a social function for
their members by promoting community cohesiveness,1 3 8 as well as a
financial function by promoting community economic development.
Members are organized into a credit group, usually headed by a wo-
man.1 39 The leader may also act as an organizer and recruiter and
tutions. See Clifford Geertz, The Rotating Credit Association: A "Middle Rung" in Develop-
ment, 10 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 241, 260 (1962).
134 SeeYoshihashi & Lubman, supra note 131, at Al; see also LIcHT & BONACICH,
supra note 129, at 244-45.
135 See FUKUYAMA, supra note 6, at 300.
136 See LIGHT, supra note 129, at 27-30.
137 See id. at 30. Anthgropologists studying the Nigeria's Yoruba people noted:
There is a society called Esusu. This society deals with monetary matters
only, and it helps its members to save and raise money thus: Every member
shall pay a certain fixed sum of money regularly at a fixed time (say every
fifth or ninth day). And one of the subscribing members shall take the total
amount subscribed for his or her own personal use. The next subscription
shall be taken by another member; this shall so continue rotationally until
every member has taken.
Id. (quoting A.K. AjisAFE, LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE YORUBA PEOPLE 48-49 (1924)).
138 Usually, the person who draws from the pot provides the association members
with a meal either at her house or at a restaurant. Kye provide more than just finan-
cial bonding; it also provides community bonding, and serves as a network for the
exchange of business information. See Arax, supra note 131, at 1 (describing a group
of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam and the group's use of the association for both social
and investment purposes); Joel Garreau, For Koreans, "Keh" is Key to Success, WASH.
POST, Nov. 3, 1991, at B1; Merrill Goozner, Age-Old Tradition Bankrolls Koreans, CHI.
TRIB., July 19, 1987, at Cl (noting the discussion by the president of the Korean-
American Drycleaners Associations of the two objectives of kyes: "'[t]o obtain capital
or establish a close intimate friendship among the members'").
139 See Garreau, supra note 138, at BI ("The Keh ... was traditionally a women's
institution in Korea. This was at least partially because the dirty job of the family
finance traditionally was perceived as women's work. But it also reflects its traditional
small-scale use-saving to buy a sewing machine, or stock feed for animals through a
season."); Gorman, supra note 133, at 62 ("The organizer, who is typically female,
keeps a record of payments and vouches for newcomers until the club disbands.").
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selects members, often based on her assessment of their honesty and
dependability. 140 The group decides how much and how often each
member contributes to the association and the basis on which money
from the association's pool may be drawn, whether by lottery, need, or
rotation.
14 1
Members belong to the association in order to secure a lump sum
of money from others, all of whom pool resources by paying a stipu-
lated amount into the common pot. The organizer arranges a feast
for the members and gets the first lump sum, which can be used with-
out restriction or condition. At the next monthly feast given by the
organizer, the members again contribute the stipulated sum, and de-
pending on how the group has chosen to determine priority or order
of collection, the person next in line-excluding the organizer who
has already received the first amount-draws from the pool.1 4 2
There are various methods for determining priority. Members
may determine priority by lottery143 or simply by need, so that those
with urgent financial needs may be moved up to the front of the
line.' 44 Other credit associations operate on the basis of a bid, and
members are required to submit sealed bids indicating the interest
they would be willing to pay. Those willing to pay the highest interest
would be eligible to receive the lump sum. Under this more competi-
tive system, those who are in financial need would have to compete
for the cash, while those who have cash surplus would be able to enjoy
the high interest rates and defer their own collection. 45 Among
Koreans in the United States, for example, the more sophisticated
kyes require members to bid for the pool by agreeing to pay a higher
interest rate in exchange for the right of priority, the right to draw on
the pool before others.146 Interest payments running as high as
For an illustrative study of women's moral reasoning as based on connection to
others and contextual in its moral judgment, see CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
140 See Szymanski & Song, supra note 119, at D1.
141 See Helen E. Jung, Secret to Korean Business Success, SEArLE TIMES, Dec. 27,
1992, at All (describing how in rotation kyes, members take turns receiving their
lump sum, while in bidding kyes members bid and the lowest bidder wins the right to
draw and the difference between the total amount in the pot and the bid is distrib-
uted to the rest of the members); Sun, supra note 130, at Al.
142 See LIGHT, supra note 129, at 24.
143 See, e.g., Goozner, supra note 138, at C1.
144 See Gorman, supra note 133, at 62; Sugawara & Tucker, supra note 131, at Al.
145 See IGHT, supra note 129, at 24.
146 See Schifrin, supra note 131, at 92 (noting that members with urgent financial
needs may bid 15% interest on a $100,000 pool and thus draw only $85,00); Garreau,
supra note 138 (noting that in the high-stakes business kyes with upper limits of
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twenty percent would then be deducted from the pool and paid out to
the other members.147 Whether by lottery or by bid, under both sce-
narios those who have drawn in the earlier rounds are not qualified to
draw until every member of the pool has had a chance to collect. Sim-
ilarly, the amount each member contributes, and hence the value of
the common pool, varies from club to club, depending on the mem-
bers' common understanding.
From an economic standpoint, rotating credit associations per-
form a valuable dual function. They act not only as a borrowing de-
vice but also as a savings device. In many parts of the world, especially
the non-Western, noneconomically developed world, rotating credit
associations have traditionally "served many of the functions of West-
ern banks. Such associations are, above all, credit institutions which
lend lump sums of money to members"148 and have been found to
"'assist in small scale capital formation.' 1 49 Those who collect early
act as borrowers and those who defer borrowing to collect in the later
rounds act as savers. Thus, rotating credit associations provide credit
for marginal borrowers1 50 as well as promote savings by forcing mem-
bers to set aside their monthly contribution. Unlike other nonprofit
institutions, such as community development banks which are heavily
subsidized by the public sector,15' these associations are entirely self-
sustaining and their capital base comes solely from their members'
$100,000, members may offer to pay more for the right to draw on the pool early);
Gorman, supra note 133, at 62 (describing associations that operate on an interest
basis allow bidders who offer the highest interest rate to draw first, although drawers
may each draw only once, until everyone else has had his or her turn).
147 See Gorman, supra note 133, at 62.
148 LIGHT, supra note 129, at 23. A large-scale survey undertaken by the Republic
of China (Taiwan) Ministry of Justice estimated in 1985 that 85% of the Taiwanese
population had participated in the "hui." SeeJane Kaufman Winn, 25 INT'L LAW 907,
917 nn.58-59 (citing ROC Ministry ofJustice, Tai Wan Di Wu Min Jian He Hui Xian
Kuang Zhi Yen Jiu [Research on the Current Condition of Rotating Credit Clubs in
Taiwan] (1985)); see also Goozner, supra note 138 ("The Korean kye is a type of rotat-
ing credit system found in many Third World societies with underdeveloped banking
traditions. Brought to the U.S. by recent immigrants, this cultural tradition-as much
a social as a business transaction-is helping fuel the remarkable surge of entrepre-
neurship by Asian immigrants, especially Koreans .... .").
149 LicHT, supra note 129, at 23 (quoting Shirley Ardenerr, The Comparative Study
of Rotating Credit Associations, 94J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 201, 217 (1964)).
150 Sociologists such as Ivan Light from UCLA have noted the social and economic
implications of rotating credit associations. "'There is a hole in our financial system
here at the bottom. Look at the stories in the paper of blacks and Chicanos being
turned down for mortgages. This shows us how to fill a hole in our system. The poten-
tial implications are very great.' Garreau, supra note 138 (quoting Light).
151 See infra note 345 and accompanying text.
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own contributions. In that sense, they promote independence from
rather than dependence on outside funding.
Historically, rotating credit associations have been crucial for the
economic development of immigrant communities in the United
States, especially because mainstream, majority-owned banks are re-
luctant to lend to low-income communities 152 and because minority-
owned banks have had low success rates and, as a result, have been
undependable sources of credit for minority communities. Although
134 banks were owned by African-Americans in the United States be-
tween 1884 and 1935, by 1929, only twenty-one had survived, and by
1945, only eleven, which means a failure rate of approximately ninety-
two percent.153 Banks owned by Asians in California in the early twen-
tieth century fared even worse, with a failure rate of 100 percent.154
Mismanagement has been blamed as the predominant reason for the
recurrent failures of minority-owned banks. A 1910 report of the Cali-
fornia superintendent of banks stated that "'[t]he Japanese banks
now in liquidation . .. are in very bad condition.... Their affairs
show that they were simply looted.'"1 5 5 Banks owned by African-
Americans suffered from similar problems of mismanagement, as well
as from economic difficulties arising from a lack of investment oppor-
tunities in African-American communities. Banks found themselves
"in the position of having to stimulate black business in order to de-
velop investment opportunities for themselves,"' 56 resulting in an in-
terlocking network of cross-ownership by banks in a centrally directed
"syndicate" of businesses, some of which were unprofitable and re-
quired unsound subsidization by the banks.
Rotating credit associations, on the other hand, operate on
wholly different principles. Their social capital base allows them to
escape the administrative burdens that plague conventional and mi-
nority-based banks, resulting in a decrease in transaction costs in both
the pre- and post-deal stages. In the United States, both now and in
the past, these rotating credit associations have been primarily respon-
sible for the proliferation of fledgling small businesses "in cities as
152 See supra notes 26-31.
153 See LIGHT, supra note 129, at 46.
154 See id. Between 1900 and 1920, the Japanese and Chinese opened ten state-
chartered banks in California. By 1910, six had closed, with the remainder closed by
the mid-1920s.
155 Id. at 50. Criminal prosecution was hampered by the fact that records were
incomplete and were in Japanese, and by the fact that most of the acts were commit-
ted before the Bank Act of 1910 which made them criminal. See id.
156 Id. at 53.
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diverse as Houston, Los Angeles, Chicago and New York. 1 57 In one
of the earliest references to the practice of relying on informal credit
mechanisms to capitalize a business, Helen Cather noted, in her 1896
work on the Chinese in San Francisco, that "' [t] he Chinese have a
peculiar method of obtaining funds without going to commercial
banks. If a responsible Chinaman needs an amount of money, he will
organize an association, each member of which will promise to pay a
certain amount on a specified day of each month for a given length of
time."' 158 Studies of New York's Chinatown revealed that "'[f] ew Chi-
nese utilized American banks' "159 and that the Chinese routinely used
rotating credit associations, the membership of which was limited to
persons from the same village in China, 60 "'to provide capital for fel-
low members who hope to start businesses.' '1 61 Indeed, "'without
such societies, very few businesses could be started."1
62
Surveys conducted from 1965-66 of foreign-born Japanese in Cal-
ifornia revealed that almost half reported having participated in some
form of mutual assistance, such as pooling money or drawing from the
tanomoshi. 163 According to a study published in 1922, mainstream
financial institutions in California engaged in systematic discrimina-
tion against Japanese businesspeople and farmers. 64 The tanomoshi
became a popular credit device because "'a merchant without security
[could] thus obtain credit.' "165 "Possibly without a system of coopera-
tive financing," in fact, "the Japanese would not have developed the
economic structure that they did."166 Similarly, migrants from the
British West Indies were particularly entrepreneurial when they ar-
rived in the United States in the early 1900S, 167 in part because of
157 Gorman, supra note 133, at 62.
158 LIGHT, supra note 129, at 25 (quoting Helen F. Clark, The Chinese of New Yor*
Contrasted with Their Foreign Neighbors, 53 CENTURY 110 (1896)).
159 Id. at 26 (quoting BEr=r LEE SUNG, MOUNTAIN OF GOLD 141-42 (1967)).
160 Early on, the Japanese rotating credit association in the United States were
limited to members who are from the same village in Japan. See id. at 28.
161 Id. at 26 (quoting Virginia Heyer, Patterns of Social Organization in New York
City's Chinatown, 60-61 (1953) (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University)).
162 Id. at 27 (quoting GOR YUN LEONG, CHINATOWN INSIDE OUT 177-78 (1936)).
163 Id. at 28 (citingJohn Modell, The Japanese of Los Angeles: A Study on Growth
and Accommodation, 1900-1946 (1969) (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University)).
164 See id. at 29 (quoting Schichiro Matsui, Economic Aspects of the Japanese Situ-
ation in California, 86-87 (1922) (M.A. thesis, University of California, Berkeley)).
165 Id.
166 Id. (quoting S.F. Miyamoto, Social Solidarity Among theJapanese in Seattle, 11 UNI-
VERSITY OF WASHINGTON PUBLICATIONS IN THE Soc. Sc. 75 (1939)).
167 West Indians "'are forever launching out in business, and such retail busi-
nesses as are in the hands of Negroes in Harlem are largely in the control of the
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their reliance on "the traditional susu credit institution as a savings
device."' 6
8
Although participation in rotating credit associations is wide-
spread among various immigrant communities, few participants are
willing to discuss their involvement on the record,169 partly out of fear
that such associations are either outright illegal or in a dubiously gray
zone. 70 Nonetheless, it has been estimated that eighty percent of Ko-
rean households in the United States belong to at least one kye,'
71
with approximately $100 million tied up at any one time in kyes in the
Washington, D.C., area alone.' 7 2 Seventy-seven percent of the entre-
preneur members of the Korean American Garment Industry Associa-
tion had participated in a kye upon immigrating to the United
States.' 7 3 Kyes in the Washington state region may constitute an ap-
proximately $120 million annual regional economy. 7 4 Ethiopian im-
migrants without access to formal credit have similarly resorted to the
foreign-born.'" LIGHT, supra note 129, at 33 (quoting W-A. Domingo, The Tropics in
New York, SURvEY, March 1, 1925, at 648-50.
168 Id. at 33; see also id. at 34-35. The survival of this traditional African institution
in the West Indies but not in the United States has been partially explained by the fact
that "[al-black Caribbean islands were hospitable to the perpetuation of African cul-
tural traditions such as the esusu. The outnumbered and subdued blacks in the
southern portion of the United States confronted much more formidable barriers to
the perpetuation of African cultural traits." Id. at 38. In other words, the economic
dependence of whites in the British Caribbean on the economy of the slaves meant
that the latter were able to maintain economic autonomy in a way not possible in the
United States. See id. at 38-41.
169 See, e.g., Szymanski & Song, supra note 119 ("Numerous kye participants in the
Tacoma area declined to talk about their investments in interviews for this story....
[and] shroud their participation from everyone but fellow investors or close family
members."); Arax, supra note 131, § 2 at 1 ("The subterranean nature of loan clubs
makes it impossible to quantify their influence. Few members are willing to talk about
their participation and even fewer want their names used.").
170 See infra note 301; see also, e.g., Szymanski & Song, supra note 119 (participants
may not report interest income, if any, from kyes, and fear Internal Revenue Service
scrutiny).
171 See Garreau, supra note 138, at BI ("Koreans are by no means the only immi-
grants whose culture features rotating credit associations. Ethiopians, West Africans,
Central Americans and Caribbean blacks all have similar popular folk institu-
tions, ... as do Chinese, Vietnamese and Japanese. But no immigrant group in the
Washington area has so systematically and successfully translated their gains into en-
trepreneurial enterprise."); see also Rhonda Richards, Two Sides of the American Dream,
USA TODAY, May 12, 1992, at lB.
172 See Garreau, supra note 138, at BI.
173 SeeJefferson, supra note 130, at R13; Arax, supra note 131, § 2 at 1 (citing a
1987 study by Ivan Light, a sociology professor).
174 See Szymanski & Song, supra note 119, at Dl.
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ekub, a "mutual assistance savings plan to which members contribute
a set amount of money each week."175 " [W]hile the American saying
is that lending money to a friend is the most effective way to end a
friendship, the Ethiopians... say that the willingness to lend money
is, in fact, a test of friendship. ' 176 The principle of trust around which
rotating credit associations are organized is itself "faithful to the Latin
from which 'credit' derives: credere-'to believe."1
77
Trust makes it possible for members of rotating credit association
to take on the commitment to adhere to group norms, including its
"no law" understanding. As "informal, small-scale banks organized
primarily by immigrants to help one another... , [the associations]
operate outside regular U.S. banking laws and safeguards."'178 The
groups determine their own rules outside the framework of formal
laws or regulation. Contracts are not written and there are no loan
agreements. The associations function strictly on "an unwritten
honor code."'1 79 Money deposited into the associations is not backed
by deposit insurance. There are no processing, accounting, or legal
fees associated with conventional bank loans. Nor are collateral or
credit checks required.' 80
Such a high level of trust is possible partly because of "preexisting
social ties based on kinship or geographic residence in the native
country' 181 and because of a long tradition against subjecting commu-
nity practices to the framework of public law. Studies found that the
esusu practiced by descendants of West African slaves in the British
Bahamas in 1910 operated entirely outside the realm of formal laws.
"These 'Asu' have no written statutes or regulations, no regular of-
ficers, but carry on their affairs without fraud or miscalculation.'18 2
Norms of trust and reciprocity make cooperation possible and en-
sure that the borrower honors her obligation to repay by continuing
to contribute regular sums into the pool until every member has had
175 Sugawara & Tucker, supra note 131, at Al.
176 Id.; see also Sun, supra note 130, at Al.
177 David Bornstein, The Barefoot Bank with Cheek, ATLANTIc MONTHLY, Dec. 1995,
at 40.
178 Gorman, supra note 133, at 62.
179 Szymanski & Song, supra note 119, at Dl.
180 Garreau, supra note 138, at Bi. The principles that govern these associations
are not much different from those that govern transactions amongJewish merchants
in New York's diamond industry. Among diamond dealers in the industry, a hand-
shake along with the words "mazel u'broche" constitutes a binding agreement. See
Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 97, at 121.
181 FUKUYAMA, supra note 6, at 301.
182 LIGHT, supra note 129, at 32 (quoting HARRY H. JoHNSON, THE NEGRO IN THE
NEW WORLD 303 (1910)).
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an opportunity to draw. Every member of the rotating credit associa-
tion must be secure in the knowledge that all others "will continue to
show up and pay their share every month, long after they have re-
ceived their own payoff" 8 3-in other words, that a common interest
in group incentive and deterrence will provide borrowers with the mo-
tivation to repay.
Additionally, since reputational sanctions represent an important
source of norm enforcement, 84 shaming has been used as a particu-
larly effective enforcement mechanism in a variety of settings, for ex-
ample, in transactions among Orthodox Jewish dealers in the
diamond industry of New York City. The Diamond Dealers Club by-
laws provide that "'[a]U decisions of arbitration panels.., which are
not complied with within 10 working days, together with the picture of
the non-complying member, shall be posted in a conspicuous place in
the Club rooms." 8 5 Similarly, members of an Ethiopian ekub claim
that "'it's easier to commit suicide'" than to renege because loss of
community standing is "'not like credit. It won't clear after seven
years."1 86 Because rotating credit associations are embedded in the
community, default would result in expulsion from the association,
resulting in "shame on not just the individual, but that person's fam-
ily. It likely would lead to difficulty in getting a job [in the commu-
nity] or even getting a marriage partner.' 87 When a member who
has already borrowed can no longer contribute to the pool because of
financial difficulties, it is understood that the association member
"will go to great lengths to borrow the money from a friend or relative
or another member of the keh, or persuade someone else to take his
183 Garreau, supra note 138, at BI.
184 See supra notes 112-23.
185 Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 97, at 128. Arbitrators who resolve disputes
among diamond dealers may also invoke a proceeding in Jewish rabbinical courts
against the party who refuses to comply with the arbitrators' decision. "Because these
courts have the authority to ban an individual from participation in the Jewish com-
munity, this is a powerful threat against Orthodox members of the diamond indus-
try." Id. at 130. Arguably this level of formality is much greater than the sanctioning
norms subscribed by less decentralized groups such as rotating credit associations. See
Charny, supra note 77, at 1841-42.
186 Sun, supra note 130, at Al.
187 Garreau, supra note 138, at B1. In instances of default, the organizer of the
club, who is given some rights and privileges-for example, either the right to draw
first, or the privilege of receiving the loan interest free-is usually held responsible
for covering the club's losses. See Gorman, supra note 133, at 62. Where individual
club members do not have personal connections with one another, their decision to
join the club is based primarily on the organizer's reputation.
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place in the keh-anything rather than default."' 88 As a member of
the Korean Association of Greater Washington remarked, "'If you owe
to someone personally, you will work the rest of your life to exonerate
yourself... It's a matter of face. The family name would go down the
drain forever.' 
189
Such duty-imposing norms make it possible for systems that oper-
ate outside the framework of the open market and public law to func-
tion effectively. It is often assumed that the market and market
institutions are determined more by the establishment of legal institu-
tions, such as property and contract laws, than by development and
"accumulation of social capital." 90 Yet, even in robust, well-function-
ing markets, contract law and the open market cannot solve all market
difficulties.' 91 Other factors may need to be taken into consideration,
for example, how certain norms further the production of social capi-
tal' 92 and what role social capital has in shaping economic behavior
and in facilitating, with minimal transaction costs, the formation and
enforcement of other types of socially useful community contracts. As
I demonstrate below, norms that promote a wealth of social capital
also translate into a concrete system of group information exchange
that facilitates mutual screening, monitoring, and enforcement, which
in turn lowers transaction costs and facilitates the formation of an al-
ternative community market for credit.
B. Information Asymmetries, Transaction Costs, and Rotating
Credit Associations
Through an overarching regime of informal community norms,
the borrowers that the formal economy has deemed not to be
creditworthy' 93 are granted access to credit from lenders who rely on
188 Garreau, supra note 138, at B1.
189 Id.
190 FUKUYAMA, supra note 6, at 11.
191 See supra Part I.
192 One of the main themes of this Article is that the law should not operate in a
way that results in the destruction of social capital. See infra Part IV. For an analysis of
how social capital can be destroyed by law, see Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of
Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2055, 2062-63 (1996).
193 "For Roscas [rotating savings and credit associations] ... to operate success-
fully it is necessary that individuals keep their commitment to pay into the Rosca after
they have won the pot. This may appear problematic since Rosca members are often
not able to borrow in conventional credit markets precisely because they cannot be
presumed to repay such loans." Timothy Besley et al., The Economics of Rotating
Savings and Credit Associations, Research Program in Development Studies, Wood-
row Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Discus-
sion Paper No. 149, May 1990, at 3.
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custom and usage, not state law, to ensure repayment and to resolve
disputes among community members. By relying on the borrowers
themselves to screen, monitor, and enforce group loans, the associa-
tion in essence relies on the actors who have the necessary informa-
tional advantage. Rather than being a perversion or avoidance of the
open market, rotating credit associations are an instance of private
ordering or community market that allows members to contract back
into community-embedded relationships in order to lower transaction
costs and generate economic exchanges which the open market could
not rationally accommodate.
As my discussion demonstrates, seemingly mundane practices,
such as those adopted by rotating credit association members, impli-
cate major, age-old issues in social and political theory. Since Hobbes
identified the problem of social disorder,19 4 many theories have been
offered to explain how to avoid the state of nature in which covenants
are routinely broken and property rights are routinely invaded. Ac-
cording to social contract theory, in a state of nature, whenever two
people enter into an agreement they always face at least two choices,
whether to keep or break the agreement. To minimize uncertainty
and to ensure that contracts entered into will be kept, both parties,
the theory maintains, will choose to cooperate by entering into a so-
cial contract to establish a state that will maintain order and enforce
the rules of the game.195 The state thus emerges as an antidote to the
state of nature and as a central source of law and order.
Since then, modem social theory has questioned whether social
order is a product of deliberate design' 96 or whether it may also
194 See THOMAS HOBBES, LmATHAN (Richard Tuck ed., 1991) (1651).
195 SeeJAMES M. BUCHANAN, THY LImrrs OF LIBERTY. BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIA-
THAN (1975).
196 See I FA. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY- RULES AND ORDER 8-34
(1973). According to Hayek, the "view... that human institutions will serve human
purposes only if they have been deliberately designed for these purposes," id. at 8, can
be traced to Rene Descartes' view of reason and rational action. As Hayek stated,
[s]ince for Descartes reason was defined as logical deduction from explicit
premises, rational action also came to mean only such action as was deter-
mined entirely by known and demonstrable truth . . . and that therefore
everything to which man owes his achievements is a product of his reasoning
thus conceived.... The 'rationalist' approach.., produced a renewed pro-
pensity to ascribe the origin of all institutions of culture to invention or de-
sign.... This intentionalist or pragmatic account of history found its fullest
expression in the conception of the formation of society by a social contract,
first in Hobbes and then in Rousseau, who in many respects was a direct
follower of Descartes.
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emerge by social evolution 97 through decentralized but loosely coor-
dinated and repeated interactions among individuals and groups.
Given the high cost of protecting against opportunistic behavior, busi-
nesses have resorted to vertical integration and long-term contracts to
protect against opportunism and to lower transaction costs.' 9 8 As Part
II demonstrates, it is also possible for order to arise spontaneously
from repeated and cooperative interactions among private groups.
Where exchanges are personalized, "the costs of contracting are em-
bedded within repeat dealings and personal knowledge of the per-
formers; and as a consequence, the costs of contracting and
enforcement are lower than in impersonal exchange, when one must
specify as precisely as possible the nature of the exchange and the
enforcement procedures.' ' 99 Thus, order is maintained via a private
ordering of cooperative interactions that in turn minimizes opportu-
nistic behaviors.
Under conditions of high uncertainty, such as information asym-
metry and enforcement difficulties involved in lending to marginal
Id. at 10. For a discussion of Cartesian rationalism, see G. DE RUGIERO, HISTORY OF
EUROPEAN LIBERALISM 21 (R.G. Collingwood trans., 1927); H.J. LAsKi, STUDIES IN LAW
AND POLITICS 20 (1922).
197 See 1 HAYEK, supra note 196, at 146-47. Hayek attributes the evolutionary ap-
proach to the English common law tradition as expounded by Matthew Hale. Under
this view,
orderliness of society which greatly increased the effectiveness of individual
action was not due solely to institutions and practices which had been in-
vented or designed for that purpose, but was largely due to a process de-
scribed at first as 'growth' and later as "evolution," a process in which
practices which had first been adopted for other reasons, or even purely
accidentally, were preserved because they enabled the group in which they
had arisen to prevail over others.
.... It came increasingly to be seen that the formation of regular patterns
in human relations that were not the conscious aim of human actions raised
a problem which required the development of a systematic social theory....
Id. at 9, 22. Such theory was provided by Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson in the
field of economics and Edmund Burke in political theory. Wilhelm von Humboldt
and F.C. von Savigny systematically applied the evolutionary approach to social phe-
nomena, and Savigny's follower, Sir Henry Maine, applied it to the social sciences.
198 See, e.g., WILLASON, supra note 86. Oliver Williamson and Douglass North are
some of the leading proponents of new institutional economics, see supra note 86,
termed "new" to distinguish it from an earlier school of economics led by John R.
Commons and Thorstein Veblen which had also analyzed institutions. See, e.g., JOHN
R. COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: ITS PLACE IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1934);
THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (1912).
199 Douglass North, The New Institutional Economics, 142J. OF INSTITUTIONAL & THE-
ORETICAL ECON. 230, 230-37 (1986).
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borrowers, trust, identity, and "social and ethical behavioral norms in-
fluence the costs of contracting,"20 0 and are especially important de-
vices for overcoming information costs2 01  that impair the
performance of markets.
The dissemination of information "has important public goods
attributes" 20 2 and "reduces the transactions costs attributable to asym-
metric information."2 0 3 Norms "embody and convey information,"
20 4
including information about community expectations and community
sanctions. Members of the association have access to the community's
reservoir of information, share a common understanding of the com-
munity's social meanings, and rely on the community's interpretive
traditions to facilitate their individual and collective ends. In these
closely knit communities, both predeal information gathering and
postdeal enforcement will be relatively friction-free and cheap. Con-
sequently, this bottom-up, decentralized approach to lending is partic-
ularly effective for small loans, especially uncollateralized ones, that
formal lenders find inefficient to lend and administer.
2 0 5
200 Id.
201 See NEIL K. KoMESAR, CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC
PoucY 101-03, 115-21 (1994). Professor Komesar singles out information costs as a
particularly significant cause of problems in decisionmaking, in the market, in the
political and judicial processes. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for ELemon. Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). Information asymme-
tries between buyer and seller may produce a "lemons" problem with dangerous prod-
ucts, driving safe ones out of the market. If safe products sell for a higher price
because they are more expensive to produce and if consumers cannot tell the differ-
ence between safe and unsafe products, safe products will be priced out of the mar-
ket. Information asymmetry between the producer and the consumer, in which the
former has information while the latter does not, lets "lemons" dominate the market.
For an analysis of the negative impact information on economic actors in this case,
see generally Steve Salop, Information and Market Structure: Information and Monopolistic
Competition, 66 AM. EcoN. REv. 240 (1976).
202 Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Efficient Scope of Private Transactions-Cost-Reducing
Institutions: The Successes and Failures of Commodity Exchanges, 24J. LEGAL STUD. 229, 241
(1995).
203 Id. at 242.
204 Katz, supra note 19, at 1749.
205 Mutual screening and monitoring are easier and more cost-effective in smaller
groups than in larger groups. SeeJoseph Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Peer Monitoring and
Credit Markets, 4 WORLD BMA ECON. REv., 351, 351-66 (1990).
There is a rise in what has been called "affinity fraud," that is, con artists using
commonality of ethnic, religious, career, or community-based groups to swindle vic-
tims out of their savings by pitching, often through the telephone, nonexisting busi-
ness opportunities or selling unregistered securities to unsophisticated buyers. See
Affinity Fraud: Beware of Swindlers Who Claim Loyalty to Your Group, <http://
www.nasaa.org/investoredu/investoralerts/ethnicaffinity.html>; Susan.Antilla, "Affin-
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By virtue of their structure and operational norms, rotating
credit associations contain certain built-in mechanisms that provide
informational remedies to lower screening costs that have constrained
banks in the formal sector. Rather than rely on the formal market as
the site of rational economic behavior, rotating credit associations rely
on social norms and personalistic transactions embedded within the
community itself to act as built-in information-gathering devices, thus
bypassing informational hurdles in the open market.
20 6
Litfle, if any, information asymmetry exists between the rotating
credit association and its members. The group has ample information
concerning the identity, history, and background of its members at its
disposal. Indeed, perhaps even more so than formal banking institu-
tions, because the effectiveness of rotating credit associations is espe-
cially dependent on extralegal norms, access to information on the
identity and trustworthiness of its members is crucial. "In a market
where enforcement depends on social ostracism or reputational dam-
age, the formation of an extralegal contract depends on information
about reputation"20 7 and functions essentially as a very low-cost substi-
tute for the formality of legally sanctioned contracts.
In addition to lowering screening costs, the same social and cul-
tural factors, such as ethnicity, identity, and community, also allow the
association to monitor borrowers; in this case, more perfect informa-
tion serves as a substitute for traditional collateral and other security
devices required by formal lenders. Principal-agent literature is re-
plete with observations about the costs that principals must assume in
order to monitor the actions of their agents.208 However, while it may
ity' Scamsters Betray Trust Based on Ethnic, Religious Links, N.Y. OBsERVER, Dec. 29, 1997
at 1; David R. Sands, In the Land of the Free: Con Artists Show Affinity for Ripping of their
Own, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1991, at A13. The issues that make such incidents of
fraud possible, however, are not present in rotating credit associations. The latter are
based not just on a general and abstract claim of common ethnicity, but rather on
personalized trust founded on membership in a small circle of common culture and
ethnicity.
206 See supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
207 Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 97, at 133.
208 The separation of ownership and control in a large firm creates agency
problems because the modem corporation is run not by the owners and shareholders
but by their agents and managers, whose goals may not coincide with those of the
owners and shareholders. See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MOD-
ERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). This principal-agent problem cre-
ates various agency costs. According to Jensen and Meckling, agency costs are the
totality of "1) the monitoring expenditures of the principal, 2) the bonding expendi-
tures by the agent, and 3) the residual loss." Michael C. Jensen & William Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. oF FIN.
ECON., 305, 308 (1976). Residual loss is loss resulting from potentials not realized due
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be costly for principals to monitor the actions of their agents, other
monitoring mechanisms allow the agents to monitor themselves or
each other at comparatively lower costs. 20 9 Rotating credit associa-
tions directly address and alleviate the high costs of monitoring
caused by asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders.
Bottom-up peer monitoring, one of the key features of rotating credit
associations, allows those in the best position to monitor the borrower
to do this monitoring themselves.
This concept is essentially based on one ofjoint liability. In rotat-
ing credit associations, there are two layers of monitoring, first from
the organizer and second from the members themselves. The associa-
tion's organizer, who is also a member of the group, acts as the guar-
antor for the group and monitors the group as a whole, as well as each
rotating borrower. When members of a rotating credit association do
not all know each other, they rely on the organizer, who has the infor-
mational advantage, to testify to the trustworthiness of those invited to
participate in the association. The organizer acts to screen members,
as well as to monitor their performance. 210 The organizer is liable if a
member who has collected from the pool defects from the group and
refuses to deposit her share in the next round of contribution, or ad-
ditionally, if a member who has not borrowed yet cannot come up
with her share on time for another to draw on.
21 '
to the inability of principals to provide the correct incentives for agents because the
agents' actions cannot be observable. See also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen,
Separation of Ownership and Contro4 26J.L. & ECON. 301, at 301 (1983); R. Rees, The
Theory of Principal and Agent, Part I, 37 Bu.. ECON. RES., 1, 3-26 (1985).
209 See Hal R. Varian, Monitoring Agents with OtherAgents, 146J. INSTrrurnONAL AND
THoRETCAL ECON. 153, at 153 (1990).
210 The organizer may select members based on their reputation for honesty and
dependability. See Szymanski & Song, supra note 119, at Dl. ("The kye-joo [orga-
nizer has heavy responsibility for the kye's success. He or she keeps any records,
collects monthly payments and distributes the monthly pot."). A similar concept is
also used in the heavily Orthodox Jewish diamond industry in New York, where bro-
kers are used "to gather information about individuals' reputations for trustworthi-
ness at a lower effective cost than individual buyers and sellers because a broker's
investment is less transaction specific." Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 97, at 133.
211 See Arax, supra note 131, § 2, at 1 ("The master picks or clears all members and
therefore must cover all defaults."); Gorman, supra note 133, at 62 (organizer held
responsible for covering club's losses in cases of default). Similar principles also gov-
ern the extralegal contractual relations in the diamond industry. The New York Dia-
mond Dealers Club, for example, which has its own private regime of rules to govern
relationships among its members, requires out of town dealers to be "sponsored" by
members before admission to the trading hall. A member in good standing must
agree "to assume 'full financial responsibility (guarantee) for the out of town dealer's
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Consequently, the organizer performs the role of information
gatherer and processor before including potential members in the
pool and continues to monitor the member during the economic life
of the pool. Thejoint liability rules of the association induce the orga-
nizer to utilize community knowledge to ascertain each member's
creditworthiness, social assets, and social traits; in other words, the
member's social collateral. 212 Because identity and trust matter and
act as low-cost signals for minimizing risks in exchange relations, the
screening and monitoring costs incurred by the organizer, herself a
member of the community, are relatively lower than the costs that
conventional banks would incur to assess lending risk and borrowers'
creditworthiness. "Trust is an important lubricant of a social sys-
tem"213 and is itself a "commodit[y] [with] . . .real, practical, eco-
nomic value."21
4
The second layer of monitoring comes from the group itself
which, by its selection or approval of members, functions on the basis
of mutual accountability and acts as an internal monitoring mecha-
nism of itself and its members. The group will have better informa-
tion about its members than a financial institution. The fact that the
group itself is composed of members from the same community allows
the group to resort to "group incentive mechanisms" 215 to engage in
mutual monitoring. Presumably, on the basis of self-selection, mem-
bers would agree to form a rotating credit association with other
members only if they are satisfied that others are relatively good credit
risks and thus would require relatively minimal monitoring. That any
member who has drawn from the pool could theoretically stop her
own contribution to the pool means that members choose to interact
with each other only on the assumption that each member's internal-
ization of community norms and/or community constraints, such as
reputational sanctions, are sufficient to minimize opportunistic behav-
ior. In other words, each person agrees to participate only if she can
trust that the other person-as each others' and the group's agent-
acts and liabilities, incurred while on the premises of the DDC.'" Bernstein, Opting
Out, supra note 97, at 119 n.5 (quoting the Diamond Dealers Club Bylaws).
212 See, for example, Magagnini, supra note 130, at B1, for an interview of a
Cambodian immigrant who said many Cambodians belong to the credit association
"'because we cannot go to the bank. We don't have anything (as collateral). But
there has to be trust. If someone cannot pay, my dad (as the dealer) has to come up
with the money. You must play with people in business where their word is good as
gold.'"
213 KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 23 (1974).
214 Id.
215 Varian, supra note 209, at 155.
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will act as good agents. "If there is no cost to locating good
agents... , then the agents will certainly find it in their interest to
only group themselves with good agents.
a216
The high costs of enforcement have also posed a significant barrier
to the development of a formal capital market for low-income borrow-
ers and low-income communities. The institutional arrangements
supporting rotating credit, however, are markedly different from
those that underlie conventional banking practices because they rely
on both internal compliance as well as group-based, self-enforcement,
schemes to ensure repayment by borrowers. First, a group member,
more likely than not, has internalized the group's norms and hence is
more likely to comply with the rules of the game. Secondi that the
"lender" is the group of which the borrower is a member also in-
creases compliance and hence the likelihood of repayment because the
loan commitment is not to an outsider or an impersonal, distant
lender such as a bank, but to a member of the community and the
group. Although it is essentially a business institution designed to
provide credit to members in need of capital, the rotating credit asso-
ciation is also a community-based endeavor that functions in the same
way that the Diamond Dealers Club in New York functions-as "an
old-fashioned mutual-aid society. '2 17 If loan delinquency occurs, it
would not be merely an instance of external loan delinquency but
rather delinquency against the entire group, and consequently against
the social fabric of the group and the community of which the group
is a part, in which case the group as well as the larger community
could sanction delinquent borrowers by imposing social penalties,
such as moral persuasion and ostracism.
By relying on the logic of norms and the claims of community,
rotating credit associations are able to correct informational asymme-
tries218 inherent in standard lender-borrower relationships and thus
minimize the high transaction costs inherent in formal lending to re-
solve the central paradox that the formal sector has yet to resolve:
216 Id. at 160.
217 Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 97, at 139 (The club "provides kosher restau-
rants for its members. Ajewish health organization provides emergency medical serv-
ices, and social committees are organized by neighborhood to visit sick members and
their families. There is a synagogue on the premises, and contributions to a benevo-
lent fund are required.").
218 But correcting informational asymmetries through the provision of informa-
tion may not be possible or worthwhile if, as Professor Sunstein noted, it is too costly.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 653, 665-67 (1993). High cost would not be an issue in the case of
rotating credit associations.
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establishing a market for loans to borrowers who possess none of the
conventional criteria used by banks to determine creditworthiness.
IV. OPEN MARKETS AND COMMUNITY MARKETS
If social capital is related to economic efficiency and if social soli-
darity lowers the cost of borrowing for rotating credit association
members, the next question is how to preserve a community lawmak-
ing system that produces a significant social benefit with little, if any,
social cost.
In Part A, I examine the role of the state in general and courts in
particular in furthering or enforcing community norms. My argu-
ment is that the state should refrain from interfering with the func-
tion of rotating credit associations. In this respect, I argue for a
judicial policy of "community nonjusticiability"219 favoring dismissal of
cases involving disputes between or among community members. In
the alternative, if and when, in certain limited circumstances, judicial
resolution is appropriate, the court should decide the dispute under
standard contract law by enforcing the parties' understanding of com-
munity norms and custom. Part A examines rotating credit associa-
tions and argues that an incentive structure arising from an
aggregation of interests among members serves to maximize group
welfare and minimize group abuse, making the case for judicial appli-
cation of group norms most persuasive.
In Part B, beyond the issue of exploring whether, under what cir-
cumstances, and to what extent the state should defer to and enforce
private custom, I also examine how socially efficient and wealth-maxi-
mizing norms that emerge from a community market can be pro-
moted. For example, how can banks incorporate some of the
efficiency benefits of rotating credit associations? And can state-pro-
moted entities, such as community development banks, replicate the
structural benefits of rotating credit associations?
A. Community Nonjusticiability and Community Norms
It is not uncommon for private groups to insist on the exclusivity
of their own dispute resolution mechanisms by prohibiting members
from resorting to formal litigation. 220 Perhaps due to the strength of
219 See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
220 See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 97, at 1788; see also Bernstein, Opting
Out, supra note 97, at 124-27, 134 ("Rational transactors might deliberately leave as-
pects of their contracting relationship to be governed, in whole or in part, by extrale-
gal commitments and sanctions."). An analogous situation can be drawn to certain
business sectors-the securities industry, for example-that require members to sub-
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community norms against resorting to judicial resolution of disputes,
there have been very few reported lawsuits brought by rotating credit
association members.22' In addition, enforcement of private arrange-
ments is rarely accomplished by litigation because of high costs and
because "parties are rarely willing to pay the reputational price of vio-
lating [the] norm [of secrecy] simply to gain access to the courts."222
Nonetheless, there have been some disputes where the plaintiff has
ignored the group's "no law" understanding and asked the court for
relief.
One of the factors to be considered by judges and other deci-
sionmakers in evaluating whether to use formal laws and their own
cost-benefit analysis, or defer to the community's informal norms in
resolving community-based disputes, is the normative component of
the community custom at issue. A business norm may emerge from
an industry and govern solely the relations among members within
the community. At some point, however, community rules may push
beyond the boundaries of the private order and intersect with public
law, for example, when insiders look to the apparatus of the state to
resolve their disputes. Then it is appropriate to ask what the response
of the state should be. On the one hand, one may question whether
certain behaviors that may constitute norms, for example, norms of
racial discrimination 22 or price-fixing, should be encouraged and en-
mit to arbitration and the industry's arbitration rules as the exclusive mode of dispute
resolution. As a general rule, courts have upheld the parties' forum selection clauses.
See, e.g., M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Carnival Cnise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); see also Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (upholding arbitration clauses). For a discussion of
how norms are relied upon by merchants in industries that ordinarily shun formal
adjudication, see Robert Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL.
L. REv. 2005, 2040-42 (1987).
Some industries such as the grain industry even prefer that courts enforce formal
rules and do not attempt to discern and enforce the business norms of grain
merchants, for fear that courts will be unable to understand the norms they seek to
enforce. See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 97, at 1796-1807.
221 A search through the state and federal court databases reveals one reported
case in 1928 in Honolulu. See Choi Heylin v. Shin SungYil, 30 Haw. 606 (Haw. 1928).
There are discussions of and references to disputes and law suits among rotating
credit associations members in the popular press. See, e.g., Szymanski & Song, supra
note 119, at D1. However, none of the suits has resulted in any reported decision
except one in Los Angeles.
222 Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 97, at 135.
223 The issues surrounding possible claims of racial discrimination arising out of
rotating credit associations are complex. They are derived from community cohesive-
ness and to a large extent, homogeneity. Inclusion of insiders often involve exclusion
of outsiders. Suppose a non-Vietnamese sued under the civil rights laws, such as
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forced by the state. 224 Custom, therefore, cannot be decisive at all
times.
On the other hand, when private communities have a compara-
tive advantage over both formal markets and governmental institu-
tions and produce rules that are both wealth-maximizing and
efficient, the social capital base of such communities should be pre-
served. In that case, when disputes arise between community mem-
bers over community norms and members turn to neutral third-party
arbiters, such as courts, for resolution, what courts should not do is
engage in decisionmaking that destroys the community's social capital
base. A recent court decision dismissing a case on the basis that a
Korean kye was an illegal lottery2 25 and that the participant's debt
therefore could not be collected in an American court is an example
of ill-considered judicial action that shapes economic preferences in a
way that may lead to the distortion of community markets. Although
the result is defensible, the reasoning is starkly misconceived. My pro-
posal is as follows. As a general rule, a court should abstain by adopt-
ing a "hands-off, nonjusticiability" posture. Or alternatively, under
exceptional circumstances when it decides to hear the case, it should
attempt to locate or discover group norms-find the law, in other
words-and defer to such norms in the resolution of group dis-
putes,2 26 especially when "the gain from better enforcement exceeds
the cost of formalization."
227
Under the first possible scenario, a court should abstain from en-
tertaining the case pursuant to a "community nonjusticiability" ap-
proach. "Community nonjusticiability" makes sense because it is
§ 1981, claiming a race-based exclusion from a Vietnamese rotating credit associa-
tion? Besides the statutory and constitutional issues, one may also ask how a liberal
society that promotes liberal values of inclusion and heterogeneity should accomo-
date community enclaves that are premised upon nonliberal values of exclusion and
homogeneity? These issues will be addressed in a forthcoming article.
224 See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 2, at 1694-96. For a discussion of how law should
treat private preferences, when to ratify preferences and when to reject preferences,
see, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CH-.
L. REv. 1129 (1986); Robin L. West, Taking Preferences Seriously, 64 TUL. L. Rrv. 659
(1990).
Nor are all norms efficient in all cases. Examples include norms of honesty
which "interfere with efficiency by preventing people from exploiting their invest-
ments in private information." Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms,
144 U. PA. L. REv. 1697, 1705 (1996) (citing Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure,
Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17-18 (1978)).
225 See infra note 302 and accompanying text.
226 See ELLICKSON, supra note 78, at 283; Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102
YALE L.J. 1315, 1320-21 (1993).
227 Cooter, supra note 2, at 1684.
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worse for courts to apply the wrong norms than not to hear the case at
all, as the former could result in a distortion of efficient community
norms 228 and hence endanger the community's repository of social
capital.2
29
Superimposing formal adjudicatory devices on informal commu-
nity devices would undermine the very community norms that give
community-based exchanges certain comparative advantages over
open market exchanges. The possibility that the entire panoply of law
backed by a formal judicial process lurks behind every rotating credit
association will result in the transformation of its very essence-
founded on a commitment to informality, community, and flexibility.
As Professor Walter Weyrauch has observed in his study of the law of
small groups, every small group produces its own background norms
of operating principles and, through its own group dynamics, gener-
ates rules of conduct for its members.230 Professor Weyrauch found in
his study that the rules of the group are not to be articulated and
indeed that if a rule is articulated, either accidentally or deliberately,
it will be discarded. Thus, "If the new rules are formally articulated as
changes, so that participants become fully conscious of the fact that
changes are taking place, then those changes might be rejected."23'
The act of articulation itself effects a change in group behavior.
Similarly, the act of formalizing an informal norm, through the
introduction of rights language, will effect a change in community in-
teraction, as formalization of informality through the force of state law
will destroy the social capital base of trust that makes informality possi-
228 Not all norms are fair or efficient. Fairness and efficiency are strong reasons
for judicial deference to norms. For a discussion of a "structural approach" where
courts would decide whether to enforce a social norm by inquiring into its underlying
incentives, see Cooter, supra note 2.
229 See infra notes 288-303 and accompanying text. Judge Edward M. Ross's deci-
sion in the Superior Court of California holding that a kye is a lottery demonstrates a
complete misunderstanding of the workings of a kye. As noted by Ivan Light, the
decision "highlights the difficulty that American law encounters when attempting to
digest foreign savings and credit institutions like the kye." Ivan Light, Lending Support
to Kyes, LA. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1993, at 22.
230 See Walter 0. Weyrauch, The 'Basic Law' or 'Constitution' of a Small Group, J. Soc.
ISSUES, Mar. 1971, at 49, 53, 59, reprinted in LAw, JusTCE AND THE INDrvmuAL I Soci-
nr. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES (June L. Tapp & Felice J. Levine eds., 1977).
231 Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 2, at 375. For a critique, see W. Michael Reisman,
Autonomy, Interdependence, and Responsibility, 103 YALE L.J. 401 (1993). Reisman argues
that this insight should be limited only to certain circumstances: "[t]he notion that
new rules should not be articulated because articulation would slow the process of
change may hold true in the context of rules that are inconsistent with the myth
system ...." Id, at 411.
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ble.232 "Once the language of rights gets started, we do think of our
moral relations in a different way.... It is as if a different 'game' were
being played, whose elements have functions that are different from
those they previously had."233 There are different types of relation-
ships and communities, ranging from personal to impersonal and
long-tern to short-term, and different types of language may be more
applicable to some communities and relationships than to others. My
argument is that "rights and rights language are more appropriate to
some of the forms of community than to others"23 4 and, specifically,
absent extraordinary circumstances, not as appropriate for communi-
ties constituted by close ties founded on norms of trust, cooperation,
and reciprocity.
Besides declining a case at the outset pursuant to "community
nonjusticiability," the court may also, in exceptional circumstances, ac-
cept it and, pursuant to the group's "no law" agreement, enforce the
group's understanding and dismiss the case. This second approach
may be termed the "contract" approach, as opposed to the "commu-
nity nonjusticiability" approach, because judicial deference to commu-
nity understandings accords with basic principles of contract law.
235
When the court enforces the parties' "no law" understanding, it is, in
fact, holding the group and its members to their own reasonable ex-
pectations: that theirs was a "gentleman's agreement" which, as de-
fined in the Oxford English Dictionary, is an "agreement which is not
enforceable at law and which is only binding as a matter of hon-
our.' ' 23 6 Assuming that " [t] he parties have capacity and competence,
act in good faith, and suffer no lack of information or defect of con-
232 In the movie "The Magnificent Seven," the hero was told that his promise to
protect the village against pillage by bandits would never be enforceable in court. His
reply: "That's the sort of promise that you have to keep." See Bernard Rudden, The
Gentleman's Agreement in Legal Theory and in Modern Practice, General Report of
the Comparative Law Conference, 15th Congress, in Bristol, England, 1998, at 1.
233 Martin G. Golding, The Significance of Rights Language, PHIL. Topics, Spring
1990, at 59-60.
234 Id. at 61.
235 First, all members knew of and favored community informality, including the
norm against judicial resolution of disputes, when they joined the group. An analo-
gous concept can be located in tort law. The parties have, in effect, knowingly as-
sumed the risk that should the bargain not work out as they had hoped and expected,
they could only resort to internal means of dispute resolution and would be left with-
out external, judicial recourse.
236 THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DIcrIONARY 453 (2d ed. 1989), cited in Rudden, supra
note 232, at 1. See also Herbert Bernstein &Joachim Zekoll, The Gentleman's Agreement
in Legal Theory and in Modern Practice: United States, 36 AM. J. Comp. L. 87, 87 n.1
(1988). ("A gentleman's agreement is an agreement which is not an agreement,
made between two persons, neither of whom is a gentleman, whereby each expects
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sent, '237 and that they have assented with each other to enter into a
"gentleman's agreement" which is to have no legal consequence,
then, under the consent theory of contracts, no legally enforceable
obligations can follow. 238 According to the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, "Parties to what would otherwise be a bargain and a con-
tract sometimes agree that their relations are not to be affected. In
the absence of any invalidating clause, such a term is represented by
the law like any other term .... ,"239 In other words, "the freedom of
contract carrie[s] with it the freedom not to contract."240 Other na-
tional jurisdictions also support this approach, 241 believing that if the
parties can subject their agreement to a certain law through a choice
of law clause, they should also be free to choose no law.
242
On the other hand, countervailing issues may cause a court to
ignore the parties' "no law" understanding and consider some other
the other to be strictly bound without himself being bound at all.") (quoting Bloom v.
Kinder [1958] T.R.91)
237 Rudden, supra note 232, at 2.
238 See Wendell H. Holmes, The Freedom Not to Contract, 60 TUL. L. REV. 751, 753
n.5 (1986) (listing sources discussing the approach of the United States and England
which favors the right of the parties to agree not to subject their agreement to law). It
is beyond the scope of this Article to delve into the general case law or into select
individual cases that address this complex issue. My argument that courts should
honor these particular types of "gentleman's agreements" is one made with the part-
ticular context of rotating credit associations in mind.
239 RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 21 (1981). See also 1 E. FARNSWORTH,
CONTRAC=S § 3.7, at 116 (1982) ("The easiest way for a party to make clear his inten-
tion not to be legally bound is to say so. In a number of commercial contexts, parties
enter into 'gentlemen's agreements that state that they are not legally binding, and it
is beyond question that the parties can in this way turn an otherwise enforceable
agreement into an uneforceable one."). Whether or not the participants in rotating
credit associations expressly and verbally state their agreements to perform their obli-
gations and settle their differences outside the realm of law, there is little doubt that
the norms of the associations call for "no law." See supra notes at 169-89. There are
exceptions, as the Restatement itself anticipates, "where a bargain has been fully or
partly performed on one side, a failure on the other side may result in unjust enrich-
ment .... RESrATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CoNTRACrs § 21 (1981).
240 Holmes, supra note 238, at 752.
241 The German reporter to the 15th Congress Comparative Law Conference
noted that "'the legal order can intervene only where the parties have expressly stated
that their declarations of intention shall produce the legal consequences." Rudden,
supranote 232, at 3. The Japanese report noted that "'gentleman's agreements oper-
ate through a tacit understanding of the parties, rather than by express disclaimer....
Japanese doctrine agrees that there are many instances of contextual no-law in social
relations among friends and family." See id. at 2.
242 Using the same analogy, if the parties can choose arbitration through an arbi-
tration clause and exclude the courts, they should be able to choose an "honors only"
option and exclude legal order. See id& at 3.
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legal principle or relation, 243 for example, notions of fairness and un-
just enrichment as between the parties244 or notions of market effi-
ciency and socialjustice. 245 There is an element of paternalism in the
law that may be proper-though as I argue, paternalism is not appro-
priate in judicial resolution of most rotating credit disputes.246 Pater-
nalistic interventions have been justified on the basis that the actors'
volitional faculties are limited because they are minors, mentally dis-
abled, or intoxicated at the time of their agreement; that private
choices, under some circumstances, are not really private and endoge-
nous but rather, to a large extent, socially constructed;247 that the
parties' choices derive from an overly narrow set of options and are
not truly informed, but instead are misconceived;248 that people's cog-
nitive abilities are limited in a number of important ways, leading
them to make erroneous choices; 249 that their actual preferences may
243 The law in some national jurisdictions concerns itself with the question of
whether private parties can agree to strip courts of their authority to decide cases.
Some jurisdictions-Japan, for example-are uncomfortable with a generalized no-
law agreement or clause "which does not specify any particular dispute [as] that
would not accord with public order." Rudden, supra note 232, at 5. The Spanish
position is "'that the parties cannot determine for themselves when a given relation-
ship will or will not be legally binding.'" Id, (citation omitted). According to the
Italian reporter, "'the Italian legal tradition is not completely ready to accept the idea
that the parties themselves can decide on the nature of their commitment, be it legal
or only moral.'" Id. (citation omitted).
244 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACrs § 21 (1981).
245 A court faced with a private agreement that might result in some unfair re-
straint of trade but that also contains a "no-law" understanding between the parties
may ignore the "no-law" understanding in order to enforce other concerns such as
market efficiency. Similarly, the court may also ignore a "no-law" understanding
among the parties to perform an agreement to discriminate on the basis of race.
These are examples of private preferences, the gratification of which might cause
harm to others. See generally Sunstein, supra note 224, at 1129.
246 Some of the examples of legal paternalism are: mandatory seatbelt use while
driving, mandatory safety measures in high-risk work environments, mandatory social
security arrangements, compulsory elementary schooling, the doctrines of unconscio-
nability and undue influence, and the limited enforceability of some contract terms
such as liquidated damages and forfeiture clauses. See Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of
Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REv. 229, 230 (1998).
247 See id. at 236.
248 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 224, at 1138-41 (1986); see also Zamir, supra note
246, at 237 ("[T]here seems to be no reason why frustrating one's actual preferences
cannot, in appropriate circumstances, maximize her overall happiness. A person's
belief that a certain course of action will yield the greatest happiness for herself may
be misconceived. Obstructing an action rooted in such a misconception may increase
the person's happiness despite the displeasure involved in having one's preferences
frustrated.").
249 See Zamir, supra note 246, at 237.
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conflict with their second-order preferences, so that while they may
choose to engage in certain conduct, they in fact wish to have their
choices paternalistically frustrated;250 or that their private preferences
inflict harm on others.2
51
On the other hand, personal freedom and autonomy are them-
selves important. Should the parties enter into an agreement that is
subject to a "no law" understanding, "freedom from contract, if re-
garded as of benefit to society, also needs to be protected, lest the
increasing concern for fairness and good faith develop into a pater-
nalistic imposition that in the end will prove deleterious to corn-
merce" 252-or, as in this case, to the very incentive structure that
makes rotating credit associations the unique entities that they are.
Paternalistic intervention is unnecessary unless there is clear evidence
that the plaintiff lacks the necessary mental condition to understand
the norms that govern rotating credit associations, or that force, du-
ress, or fraud was involved. If, for example, the organizer made delib-
erate misrepresentations to the plaintiff by telling the plaintiff that she
would be joining a kye and the plaintiff later discovered, after several
rounds of "contributions," that the organizer and the other members
had set her up only to take her money, there would be no reason for a
court to abstain from a civil suit or for the prosecutor to abstain from
initiating criminal prosecution as well. 25 3 Otherwise, paternalistic in-
terventions are more difficult tojustify under most circumstances. For
example, while it is true that the parties' choice to participate in a
credit association is itself the result of a lack of choice in the formal,
open market, paternalistic intervention that results in the distortion of
community markets will only result in a further contraction, not max-
imization, of available options.
The question of judicial enforcement of, and deference to, pri-
vate understandings has been explored in a slightly different although
250 See Sunstein, supra note 224, at 1129, for the argument that second order
preferences justify paternalism. For example, a person who acts recklessly and prefers
not to use seatbelt may herself wish she were more prudent. Such a person may also
approve of paternalistic intervention designed to frustrate her first-order preferences.
251 See id. at 1131
252 Bernstein & Zekoll, supra note 236, at 95.
253 As reported in the Tacoma, Washington press in 1996, a woman, Ms. Kyung
Hee Yi, organized multiple, separate kyes that totaled 100 investors. For reasons pub-
licly unknown, she did not make payments to investors as required. When some inves-
tors, many of whom had not met each other, confronted Ms. Yi, she told them kye
funds were not available. The sherriff's office was called. Ms. Yi was arrested. How-
ever, she was not charged with a crime because "investigators found so little
paperwork associated with Yi's kyes that they doubted they could mount a successful
prosecution." Szymanski & Song, supra note 119, at D1.
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sufficiently analogous context.254 The understandings and bylaws
adopted by voluntary, private associations, for example, generally set
forth not only the benefits to be conferred upon members, but also
the association's rules regarding how disputes among members and
the association will be resolved.255 Major League Baseball, a self-gov-
erning private association of baseball clubs, grants the Commissioner
broad powers to sanction any act not in the best interests of base-
ball.25 6 The Major League and the constituent clubs also severally
agree "'to be finally and unappealably bound by such actions and sev-
erally waive such right of recourse to the courts as would otherwise
have existed in their favor.'-
25 7
When challenges to the Commissioner's authority have been
brought, the Commissioner's power to impose remedial or punitive
sanctions without judicial interference has been upheld by the courts.
In a case challenging the Commissioner's "best interests of baseball"
clause, the Seventh Circuit held that the parties had voluntarily con-
tracted to grant the Commissioner authority to forbid recourse to the
courts.258 The court also found that even in the absence of a "waiver
ofjudicial recourse" provision, "'it is generally held that courts.., will
not intervene in questions involving the enforcement of bylaws and
matters of discipline in voluntary associations.' ",259 Thus, the "nojudi-
254 I thank Professor William Van Alstyne for suggesting the comparison with the
law of private associations.
255 Private voluntary associations usually have internal disciplinary codes and are
governed by rules agreed to by the members. For example, Major League Baseball
has its own disciplinary process independent from judicial interference. SeeJeffrey A.
Durney, Fair orFoul? The Commissioner and Major League Baseball's Disciplinary Process, 41
EMORY L.J. 581 (1992).
256 My discussion of Major League Baseball as an example of private associations
that enjoy a high degree of autonomy and noninterference by courts is drawn from
Jeffrey A. Durney. See id.
257 Id. at 587.
258 See Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 876 (1978).
259 American Fed. of Tech. Eng'rs v. LaJeunesse, 347 N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ill. 1976)
(cited in Kuhn, 569 F.2d at 545 (Fairchild, J., concurring)). See also Van Daele v. Vinci,
282 N.E.2d 728, 731 (Ill. 1972); Engel v. Walsh, 101 N.E. 222, 223 (Ill. 1913).
In a separate concurring opinion, Chief Judge Fairchild disagreed with the ma-
jority's "sweeping holding that the waiver of recourse to the courts provision, unless
narrow exceptions exist, is 'valid and binding on the parties and the courts.'" Kuhn,
569 F.2d at 545. Citing to an Illinois case which held that agreements designed to
oust the courts of jurisdiction are void as contrary to public policy, see In re Streck's
Estate, 183 N.E.2d 26, 31 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962),Judge Fairchild noted that although the
scope ofjudicial review of the Commissioner's decision is extremely narrow, the Com-
missioner's decision could be overturned if the owner could establish that the Com-
missioner acted with bias or malice.
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cial recourse" clause "can be upheld as coinciding with the common
law standard disallowing court interference."260
Indeed, courts have long recognized that private associations may
select their own system of self-governance and self-discipline. 26' "[I] t
is well-established that a voluntary association may, without direction
or interference by the courts, draw up for its government and adopt
rules, regulations and by-laws which will be controlling as to all ques-
tions of... doctrine or internal policy. ' 262 Absent compelling circum-
stances, such as abuse of discretion or arbitrary invasion of private
rights, courts will not interfere with questions concerning the associa-
tion's "'policy, doctrine, or discipline.... Courts will compel adher-
ence to the charter and to the purpose for which the society was
organized, but they will not do more."' 263 The only rights and duties
courts need to address are those "created by the private law of the
parties, insofar as such contract rights did not exceed statutory
bounds or conscionable reaches. '264 Generally speaking, then, "there
should be no judicial interference with the internal affairs, rules and
by-laws of a voluntary association unless their enforcement would be
arbitrary, capricious or constitute an abuse of discretion."265 Indeed,
"Only the most abusive and obnoxious by-law provision could prop-
260 Kuhn, 569 F.2d at 543.
261 See Durney, supra note 255, at 596 ("'[T] he courts have been very hesitant to
intervene in any self-governing private organization. Otherwise there would be a
flood of lawsuits every time some woman didn't win the presidency of the local flower
club.'") (quoting Professor Gary Roberts whose comments can be found in Tom Ver-
ducci, Appeal?. Forget It Boss, NEWSDAY, July 26, 1990, at 125).
262 6 AM. JUR. 2d, Associations and Clubs, § 5, at 433 (1963) (citations omitted).
263 Orchard Ridge Country Club, Inc. v. Schrey, 470 N.E.2d 780, 783 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1984) (quoting Supreme Lodge, Knites of Pythias v. Knight, 117 Ind. 489,
496-97 (1889). See, e.g., Hebert v. Ventetuolo, 480 A.2d 403 (R.I. 1984) (upholding
Rhode Island Interscholastic League's suspension of students based on the league's
rules governing eligibility of transfer students to participate in interscholastic athletics
against the claim that such participation is a constitutionally protected right); Caso v.
New York State Pub. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 78 A.D.2d 41 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)
(refusing to interfere with the association's internal affairs upon finding that the vol-
untary association of schools adhered to its own rules and that the plaintiff had vio-
lated the rules, resulting in his ineligibility to participate in certain sports
competitions); Crandall v. North Dakota High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 261 N.W.2d 921,
926 (N.D. 1978) (finding that the association's eligibility rules are not arbitrary or
unreasonable and refusing to "determine the wisdom of such rules when they are
reasonable").
264 Leon v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 358 F. Supp. 877, 886 (D.NJ. 1973), affd 474
F.2d 1340 (3rd Cir. 1973).
265 Hebert, 480 A.2d at 407 (citations omitted). The Rhode Island court found that
the defendant Rhode Island Interscholastic League may promulgate rules governing
the eligibility of transfer students to participate in interscholastic sports.
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erly invite a court's intrusion into what is essentially a business
thicket."2
66
As a general and relatively clear-cut proposition, rotating credit
associations, like other private voluntary associations, should be al-
lowed to promote and enforce norms that govern the group's internal
affairs. Although there are no express written rules and regulations
similar to those in the Major League Agreement, or those in the by-
laws and articles of incorporation that typically govern many associa-
tions, the norms adhered to by members of rotating credit associa-
tions are as much an expression of community self-governance as the
rules and regulations enacted by the more formal associations. Addi-
tionally, that the norms of rotating credit associations emerge rather
"spontaneously" from a normative system characterized more by the
evolving nature of the parties' interactions than by a "centralized
agency for formulating or enforcing rules"267 -whether it be written
contractual rules that make up the nonlegal but comprehensive gov-
ernance regime of Major League baseball, the American grain indus-
try, or the Japanese products liability system 26 8-should not matter for
the purpose of the present inquiry.
The defining issue as far as judicial enforcement of an associa-
tion's private law is concerned is not whether the understandings
adopted by a private association consist of written rules of conduct
and comprehensive procedures of enforcement, but rather whether
or not the private association operates within an "institutional envi-
ronment" with its own background constraints or "rules of the game,"
so to speak, that guide individual behavior. "Institutional environ-
ment," as used by Professors Lance Davis and Douglass North, refers
to background rules which can be either formal, explicit rules or in-
formal, implicit ones, such as social conventions and norms. 269
266 Leon, 358 F. Supp. at 885.
267 Charny, supra note 77, at 1845.
268 See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of norms that
evolve via informal but regularized interactions among members of groups versus
norms that arise from a centralized, "state-like" agency. In the former scenario, the
nonlegal regime-for example, of ranchers in Shasta County, California or of partici-
pants in rotating credit associations-consists of norms that derive from rather "infor-
mal and diffuse sanctioning systems." Charny, supra note 77, at 1845. In the latter
scenario, as Professor David Charny noted, the nonlegal governance regime is "estab-
lished in a two-step process: first, norms evolve as a result of transactors' dealings (as
in the grain industry) or industry consensus (standards identifying 'design defects');
second, the centralized agency selects among, codifies, and enforces these norms."
Id at 1841.
269 Peter G. Klein, New Institutional Economics, at 3 (July 1998) (unpublished
paper on file with author) (citing LANcE E. DAVIS & DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITU-
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While these background rules [the institutional environment] are
the product of-and can be explained in terms of-the goals, be-
liefs, and choices of individual actors, the social result (the rule it-
self) is typically not known or "designed" by anyone. Institutional
arrangements, by contrast, are specific guidelines ... designed by
trading partners to mediate particular economic relationships. Busi-
ness firms, long-term contracts, public bureaucracies, nonprofit or-
ganizations, and other contractual agreements are examples of
institutional arrangements.
2 70
To the extent that courts routinely defer to the "institutional ar-
rangements"-the specific rules, regulations, or guidelines established
by private voluntary associations-the same deference should be ac-
corded to the "institutional environment"e-the norms, social conven-
tions, or "rules of the game" that structure social conduct within
rotating credit associations.
In some circumstances, which I discuss below, it may be appropri-
ate for a court to hear the case, although again, judicial resolution
should be the exception rather than the rule.2 71 In such cases, as I
have argued, the court should look to community norm and practice,
custom, and usage, rather than perform a traditional cost-benefit anal-
ysis, which calls for judges to choose among alternative rules by com-
paring and contrasting their costs and their benefits.27 2 "[Pirivate
parties are apt to have better information about their own positions
than the state, even if their information is . . itself highly
imperfect."
27 3
TIONAL CHANGE AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH (Cambridge University Press
1971)).
270 See id.
271 See infra notes 301-07 and accompanying text.
272 See Epstein, supra note 103, at 5-6.
Although championed by Landes and Posner, Steven Shavell, and other con-
servative economists, the cost-benefit formula is, when generally applied, far
more interventionist than the standard of care based on custom. The cost-
benefit tests are used to challenge the rationality of markets, while formulas
based on custom accept and rely on some level of implicit rationality in mar-
ket bahavior.
Id.
273 Richard A. Epstein, Issues in Tort Reform: The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OHIO ST.
LJ. 469, 471 (1987); see also Epstein, supra note 103, at 24 ("The substantive differ-
ences between the two approaches-custom and cost benefit-are enormous. When
custom is used, the courts can, in effect, function in a reactive fashion, relying on the
practices formulated by those who have powerful incentives to get things right be-
cause of the daily peril in which they labor.").
Others have adopted a pragmatic approach: "if public policymakers have good
reason to think that a given private norm is efficient, based on their own independent
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Although the issues in this Article concern the law of contracts
rather than the law of torts, the controversy over methodology-the
relevance of custom versus an independent cost-benefit approach-
has been especially pronounced in tort cases. In a standard cost-bene-
fit approach, for example, courts use the Learned Hand rule es-
poused in the landmark case United States v. Carroll Towing CO.
2 7 4 to
determine negligence, that is, to assess if "the burden of adequate pre-
cautions 2 75 undertaken by a defendant would be less than expected
savings in liability.2 76 In that case, a barge which broke loose from a
mooring collided with other vessels. Because there was no community
standard to govern the duty of the bargee, Judge Hand applied his
own cost-benefit analysis to determine whether or not the defendant
should be found negligent and hence liable for damages to other ves-
sel owners.
But where custom exists and is discernible, and where a person
behaves as others in like circumstances, one may infer that she is act-
ing in conformity with community standards of reasonableness. 277 "In
particular instances, where there is nothing in the situation or in com-
mon experience to lead to the contrary conclusion, this inference may
be so strong as to call for a directed verdict .... ,,278 As Judge Posner
noted in Rodi Yachts, Inc. v. National Marine, Inc.,2 79 "the focus of
the ... court's inquiry should be on the parties' respective compliance
with and departures from the customs .... 20 especially because of
the parties' "reasonable expectations that the firms with which they
deal are complying with the standard of care customary in the indus-
analysis, they should defer to it, and if they have good reason to think it inefficient,
they should not defer." Katz, supra note 19, at 1752.
274 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
275 Id. at 173.
276 My discussion relies on Professor Robert Cooter's comparative evaluation of a
cost-benefit analysis versus a deference to custom analysis in tort law. See Cooter,
supra note 2, at 1678-82.
277 But see The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932). This case, also decided by
Judge Hand, denies any conclusive weight to custom and complements the cost-bene-
fit formula he later adopted in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir.
1947). Judge Hand's view has received widespread acceptance among courts and
commentators. See, e.g., Bimberg v. Northern Pac. Ry., 14 N.W.2d 410, 413 (Minn.
1944) ("Local usage and general custom, either singly or in combination, will not
justify or excuse negligence. They are merely foxholes in one of the battlefields of
law, providing shelter, but not complete protection against charges of negligence.").
278 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A cmt. b (1974).
279 984 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that compliance with custom is a de-
fense to a tort claim in a case where a barge broke loose and caused damage to other
vessels.).
280 Id. at 888-89.
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try... [and because] these customs appear to reflect an undistorted
market determination of the best way to minimize" costs.
2 8 '
It has been suggested that an approach that favors deference to
custom is analogous to the English model of adjudication and accom-
modation which arose in the eighteenth century when the formal
legal system found itself increasingly in contact with the practices of
merchants who had developed their own norms to regulate trade.
282
Medieval law merchants, enforced by the threat of ostracism, devel-
oped out of a system of private courts established by English
merchants to resolve disputes among themselves. As the English legal
system came into increasing contact with cases involving general
merchant practice, English judges faced commercial disputes which
had once been handled privately.283 Rather than make new rules or
substitute their own for the merchants, English judges "tried to dis-
cover those rules that already existed among the merchants, and then
selectively enforced them,"2 84 deferring, in other words, to merchant
custom.
There are efficiency benefits to this approach because, where ap-
propriate, deference to custom is cost-effective. "[M] ost situations are
not distinctive or novel but fall into certain repetitive patterns,"285 and
thus most business communities have developed "simple rules of
thumb and standard practices to guide them in their daily work."28
6
Someone who relies on existing custom for his interactions
can now rest in relative comfort on the knowledge that others with
greater experience and knowledge have adopted a pattern of doing
business on which he can sensibly free ride. Custom is a socially
desirable form of free tiding that offers a cheap and reliable source
of information about a form of agreement that is worthy of use be-
cause of the impersonality and universality of its origins.
287
The customary norms of rotating credit associations are precisely
the type of norms to which the state should defer.28 8 They arise out of
281 Id. at 809. Of course, whether or not a market decision is efficient may be
determined by a cost-benefit analysis. Economists, however, understand that the in-
formation required to conduct a complete analysis may not be available and thus
"answer the question indirectly, by discussing market structure and firm behavior."
Cooter, supra note 2, at 1680.
282 See Cooter, supra note 2, at 1648.
283 See generally Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S.
ECON. J. 644, 644-61 (1989).
284 Cooter, supra note 2, at 1648.
285 Epstein, supra note 143, at 6.
286 Id.
287 Id. at 10.
288 See Katz, supra note 19, at 1752.
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consensual arrangements among willing participants and are contract,
not tort, cases. Thus, these norms register the preferences of parties
to the custom, not strangers or third parties who are victimized by it.
Unlike tort cases, no victims are injured by acts arising from credit
arrangements who are not already members of the community and
already insiders party to the custom. 2 9 Additionally, as Part III of this
Article demonstrates, a rotating credit association represents a healthy
instance of private ordering governed both by norms of the market
and norms of community ethics. First, there is a long and rich history
of immigrant participation in such associations, which has played a
crucial role not only in the financial viability of immigrant communi-
ties, but also in their social and cultural cohesiveness. Second, these
associations have survived and continue to be relied upon, especially
by new immigrants who lack credit histories and collateral, precisely
because the formal financial market is incapable of transcending the
high transaction costs due to informational asymmetry between bor-
rowers and lenders in the open market. Third, the associations must
be seen, therefore, as a rational and efficient community response to
open market imperfections through community market formation.
Here, the market preference for efficiency and wealth maximiza-
tion is consonant with, rather than detrimental to, the values of com-
munity reciprocity and commitment that market critics claim are
devalued by market behaviors. 290 The market, it has often been
charged, presumes and takes as self-evident individual autonomy and
thus atomizes the individual from his larger society "by tangibly re-
warding narrowly self-interested behavior, by penalizing altruism, and
by devaluing commitment. '291 Furthermore, there has been a rising
sense of concern that the dominance of the global economy will result
in an economic hegemony that "wipes out" local markets and possibly
"erases" local culture and local communities. 292 Wal-Mart, one of the
largest retailers in the United States, for example, has been facing sig-
nificant opposition to its expansion into certain communities and
neighborhoods because of the fear that its overwhelming economic
prowess will result in the decimation of smaller stores owned by local,
289 But see supra note 223.
290 See, e.g., MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DiscoNTENT (1996).
291 Allen E. Buchanan, Assessing the Communitarian Oitique of Liberalism, 99 ETHics
852, 866 (1989).
292 See genereally Taibi, supra note 5, at 961 (analyzing the ways in which transac-
tional capital and the global economy "undermin[e] the economic, cultural, and so-
cial foundations of non-elite communities").
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independent merchants.2 93 In a highly competitive age, markets in
general, and capital markets in particular, whether they be global or
national,294 are driven by concerns that transcend local interests in
ways that may be detrimental to community concerns.2 95 It is thus all
the more important that the decentralized exercise of community ini-
tiatives and the utilization of local institutional resources, which result
in local market economic investment in ways that are inclusive of un-
derrepresented groups, be supported rather than impeded.
The norms that govern rotating credit associations and guide the
behaviors of members maximize cooperation and commitment for
the purpose of creating economic value for their economically
marginalized members. Members interact with each other not as at-
omized individuals but as community members who utilize and mar-
shal their community membership to maximize individual as well as
group interests. In other words, economic value is dependent not on
disaggregation but instead on an aggregation of interests.
296
While formal institutional lending operates on the premise that
lenders and borrowers are disaggregated entities likely resulting in
high transaction costs for lenders, rotating credit associations work
only if "lenders" and "borrowers" constitute a single entity with con-
vergent commitments. The "lender" in a rotating credit association is
itself the borrower and vice-versa; stated another way, a member func-
293 See Ellen Neuborne, David Beats Goliath in Wal-Mart Pricing War, USA TODAY,
Oct. 13, 1993, at Bi; Fran Silverman, State's Communities Put up a Wall of Resistance to
Wal-Mart, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 28, 1994, at A3.
294 See Enrique Carrasco & Randall Thomas, Encouraging Relational Investment and
Controlling Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries in the Aftemath of the Mexican Fi-
nancial Crisis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSN'L L. 539 (1996) (analyzing the impact of highly
mobile capital investment, as opposed to more long-term investments such as foreign
direct investment, on the national economies of less developed countries in general
and that of Mexico in particular).
295 By now there is a voluminous amount of criticism directed at the global corpo-
ration and its encroachment in and destructionf of the local market. For recent popu-
lar articles that address this issue, see, for example, Richard J. Barnet, Lords of the
Global Economy, NATION, Dec. 19, 1994, at 754; Richard J. Barnet, The End of Jobs,
HARPER'S, Sept. 1993, at 47; Jeremy Brechner & Tim Costello, Taking on the Multina-
tionals, NATION, Dec. 19, 1994, at 757; Noam Chomsky, Notes on NAFFA: 'The Masters of
Mankind,' NATION, March. 29, 1993, at 412.
296 One can also make the case that trust is necessary to restrain force or fraud.
See Granovetter, supra note 65, at 489. But it is also true that "networks of social
relations penetrate irregularly and in differing degrees in different sectors of eco-
nomic life, thus allowing for... distrust, opportunism, and disorder...." Id. at 491.
While trust is certainly an important element in a rotating credit association, it is the
aggregation of the interests of the group and its members that most effectively curbs
abuse, coercion, or force against group members by the group.
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tions both as a "lender" and as a "borrower,"297 resulting in a conflu-
ence of interests between "lender" and "borrower." The "lender" is
capitalized by its members. Membership in the association aligns the
interests of "lender" with "borrower" and those of "borrowers" with
other "borrowers," so that there are fewer problems of information
asymmetry and hence a minimization of screening, monitoring, and
enforcement costs. 2 98 The group plays both the role of the market
and the community. Default by one member represents a wrong com-
mitted against not just the other members but against the association
itself.
This aggregation of interests produces an institutional structure
that acts as a disincentive against defection or default and also against
abuse, specifically abuse by the group against its individual members.
Membership is voluntary, and members are selected because the orga-
nizer, as the guarantor, and the other members, as participants, have
mutually screened each other. Information that governs group ex-
changes is symmetrical rather than asymmetrical, and thus members
are not uninformed "lenders" or "borrowers." The terms and condi-
tions of participation derive from mutual agreement, and the enforce-
ment mechanisms are founded on community norms that emerge
from the bottom up, not from the top down. This aggregation of in-
terests and the incentive structure derived therefrom distinguishes ro-
tating credit associations from other coercive institutions, such as the
loan shark. The difference is not simply the most obvious one, that
shaming is different from physical beating and murder. Even in those
rare instances when interest on a rotating credit association loan rises
to a level of twenty percent 299 or more, a rotating credit association is
still different from a loan shark-precisely because the aggregation of
interests between the group and its members acts as a significant built-
in check against impulses toward group exploitation and abuse.300
I have thus far argued that courts should either decline a case
that involves a rotating credit dispute under "community nonjusti-
297 When member A contributes to a pool and member B draws, A can be deemed
a lender and B a borrower. When A draws in the next round, A is then the borrower
and B, who has drawn and can no longer draw until everyone has drawn, is then the
lender. If analyzed from a group rather than an individual level, one also can say that
the group is the lender and the members are the borrowers.
298 See supra notes 206-18 and accompanying text.
299 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
300 See Eric Posner, The Regulation of Groups, 133 U. CHI. L. REv. 133, 170 (1996)
("One doubts the importance of usury laws and corporate laws, which are designed to
protect uninformed borrowers and investors, when the members share ties of kinship,
friendship, and community.").
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iciability" or else take the case but, guided by the law of voluntary
associations, adopt a "contract" approach and defer to private norms.
I have also argued that norm deference is appropriate because the
norms of rotating credit associations are consonant with values worth
promoting: wealth maximization, efficiency, community reciprocity,
and trust. If the norm of the group is one of "no law," then a court
should "enforce" this norm and defer to it, that is, resolve the case by
"finding" the law of the group and applying it to the dispute at hand.
My argument that community norms should be controlling in ju-
dicial resolution of disputes can be illustrated in the following case.
Currently, it is unclear whether rotating credit associations are legal
or illegal, and a recent California case only muddles the picture fur-
ther.30' In 1993, a dispute began when the Songs, a Los Angeles
couple whose relative had declared bankruptcy and stopped making
his own monthly payment into another kye, were asked by the or-
ganizers to supply collateral to secure future payments into the pot
before the couple would be allowed to collect.30 2 No other kye mem-
ber had been asked to provide security. When the couple refused and
were told by the organizers that, they could not collect from the pot,
they refused to make further contributions. The organizers sued in
the Superior Court of Los Angeles for the amount the Songs were
obligated to contribute as their monthly sum. The judge dismissed
the case upon finding that the kye is itself an illegal lottery and also a
form of security which was being sold without prior permission from
the proper authorities.
While the state has interests in protecting entities that deliver a
collective good as well as in preventing fraud or violations of state law,
the judge's decision accomplishes neither objective. First, as Eric Pos-
ner suggested in a recent article, the assumption that
the kye [was] a lottery was erroneous. Lotteries appeal only to risk
takers because the cost of the ticket exceeds the expected payout. A
share in a kye, however, like a savings account with a bank or a loan
from a bank, appeals to anyone who seeks to flatten out his con-
301 See Robert Reinhold, The Koreans' Big Entry into Business, N.Y. TiMms., Sept. 24,
1989, atA4 ("The kye ... is fast, efficient, effective-and quite illegal under American
law."). Under California law, rotating credit associations like the kye are not regu-
lated. See Kenneth Howe, Lending Clubs Collapse Amid Fraud Charges, S.F. Bus. TIvMs,
June 29, 1987, § 1, at 1; see also Douglas Frantz, Hanmi Bank Uses Ancient Asian Lending
Practice To Help Koreans, LA. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1988, § 1, at 1 (discussing whether or not
the failure of kye members to report interest income on their tax returns constitutes a
violation of the tax codes).
302 See Kenneth Reich, Private Investment Pools Dealt Blow, LA. TIMES, Sept. 25,
1993, at Bi.
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sumption over time; the member's contributions, adjusted for inter-
est, equal his expected payout.
30 3
Second, although it is unclear whether this particular kye had vio-
lated tax or usury laws, it is also questionable whether or not such laws
are necessary or effective against the communal background norms of
kyes. "One doubts the importance of usury laws and corporate laws,
which are designed to protect uninformed borrowers and investors,
when the members share ties of kinship, friendship, and commu-
nity."30 4 And third, there is no functional difference between kyes ver-
sus the many instances in which "'friends put money in, make a pool
and give personal loans for educational expenses or a business with-
out the paperwork, collateral, credit checks and high rate of rejection
involved with bank loans. 30 5
It should be emphasized that the decision to file a complaint is
itself an anomaly, as the norm against resorting to formal judicial pro-
cess to resolve community disputes is usually quite strong.30 6 Under
normal circumstances, nonlegal sanctions would likely have been suf-
ficient to force both the organizers and the Songs to come to an ac-
ceptable resolution of the dispute. The suit, however, arose in the
aftermath of the Los Angeles riots, when the devastation of the Ko-
rean-American community made the threat of nonlegal sanctions
such as community ostracism less effective, and hence defection from
community norms more attractive. One could view the riots as the
equivalent of a force majeure event justifying the institution of a lawsuit
in contravention of community norms in order to enforce those
norms.
In ruling that the organizers had no legal recourse to collect
debts from those who participated in kyes because the kye was itself an
illegal entity and the entire arrangement was presumably null-and-
void, the judge failed to recognize the social function of kyes in com-
munity development and, by his threshold decision, kept the court
from looking beneath the veil of formality and state regulation to the
303 Posner, supra note 300, at 174-75 n.118. See also Ivan Light, Lending Support to
Kyes, L.A. Times, Oct. 24, 1993, § 1, at 22 ("The associations are not lotteries in any
ordinary meaning of the term, so they cannot be illegal lotteries. Lotteries afford
players only a slim probability of recouping even their original investment. In con-
trast, the associations guarantee all participants the return of their principal. The
only uncertainty concerns how soon they get their money back.").
304 Posner, supra note 300, at 170.
305 Jake Doherty, An American Wrinkle in Korean Loans, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 3, 1993,
§ 1, at 3 (quoting Benjamin B. Hong, Chief Executive Officer of Harris Bank).
306 See ELLCESON, supra note 78, at 60-64; Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Rela-
tions in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55, 61 (1963).
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underlying custom that governs the activities of such credit associa-
tions. Assuming that the court would have been correct in hearing
the case-in other words, assuming that the case constituted a legiti-
mate, though rare, instance in which judicial resolution was appropri-
ate-the question should have been recast to allow the court to
examine whether fraud or bad faith was involved.
Once it took the case, the court should have located the law that
governs the expectations and behavior of kye members in the same
way that courts do when faced with an issue of industry custom or
usage among merchants. 30 7 Some of the questions the court could
and should have asked include: was there a norm that allowed the
organizers to demand collateral of kye members? If such a norm did
not exist among kye members, was it nonetheless an expectation
among members of this particular kye? Was the couple that asked to
produce collateral justified in refusing to make additional payments?
Was it understood that collateral could be demanded under certain
limited circumstances to protect the security of the kye, if relatives of
kye members were discovered to experience financial difficulty? In
other words, was it the accepted custom that the respective social capi-
tal bases of the participants consisted not just of their own but also
that of their relatives? If so, were the organizers justified in demand-
ing economic security, if kyes function well only in the context of fam-
ily as well as community stability and cohesiveness?
Judicial nonintervention-or in exceptional cases warranting in-
tervention, the application of the group's own norms as I have advo-
cated-should work unproblematically in nearly all cases. However,
there might still be some potentially disturbing issues to be addressed.
Although it is clear that the parties involved in a kye have explicitly or
implicitly agreed to subject themselves to the rules of the association,
one still wonders about the extent to which courts should enforce the
"no law" norm, especially when an act performed by a group's mem-
bers in accordance with group norms causes ancillary harm to one or
more of the members. Should the court still enforce the "no law"
norm by deferring to it, effectively declaring that it will not hear a
common law claim for restitution?
For example, suppose that someone defaults on her contribu-
tions "without cause," so that the defaulter has in essence defected
307 For an analogue, see The Uniform Commercial Code, which allows course of
dealing, usage of trade, or course of performance to be considered in the interpreta-
tion of express contract terms. See U.C.C. § 1-205(1) (1991). "[T]hese sources may
not only supplement or qualify express terms, but in appropriate circumstances, may
even override express terms." 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT SUMMERS, UNIFoRM COM-
MERCI&L CODE, § 3-3, at 121 (4th ed. 1995).
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from the group after having drawn her contribution from the com-
mon pool.3 0 8 The group as a whole, or an individual member of the
group who would have been the next eligible drawer, takes the neces-
sary enforcement action against the defector, designed to heap shame
upon the defector and deter others from defecting. An ad is placed in
the local paper identifying the person as an untrustworthy person who
has failed to meet her obligation to the association. As a result, her
reputation is damaged and her business (assume she owns a small,
service-oriented business) suffers. Group members telephone her
persistently to berate her. Her children are accosted and told of their
mother's disgraceful behavior. The defector, in other words, is alter-
nately harassed and shunned from the community.30 9 She sues for
invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
tortious interference with her business. Should the court decline to
hear the case, in essence ratifying the group's sanctions against a way-
ward member in deference to its norms of shunning and shaming?
The answer depends on the facts of the case, and courts should, as I
propose below, balance the norms and needs of the community with
other areas of paramount state concern.
Shunning has been used by religious groups such as the Amish,
the Mennonites, and theJehovah's Witnesses to maintain and enforce
religious unity and cohesiveness.310 Shunning can cause a shunned
person to lose her spouse,311 children,312 business,313 and overall
standing in the community.
308 I thank Professor William Van Alstyne for posing the following hypotheticals
and for suggesting comparisons with religious shunning cases.
309 For a general discussion of various theories of ostracism, see OsTRAcIsM: A So-
CIAL AND BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON (Margaret Gruter & Roger D. Masters eds., 1986).
See also Margaret Gruter, Ostracism on Trial: The Limits of Individual Rights, 7 ETHOLOGY
& SOCIOBIOLOGY 271 (1986).
310 In the Amish community, Bann und Meidung, which means excommunication
and shunning, require "that members receive no favors from the excommunicated
person, that they do not buy from or sell to an excommunicated person, that no
member shall eat at the same table with an excommunicated person, and if the case
involves husband or wife, they are to suspend their usual marital relations." Justin K
Miller, Comment, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't: Religious Shunning and the
Free Exercise Clause, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 271, 272 n.5 (1988) (citingJ. HOSTETLER, AMISH
SOcIETY 63 (1963)).
311 See generally id. at 273 n.6, for a discussion of cases in which the spouse of the
shunned person is encouraged to leave or shun the latter in accordance with church
doctrine.
312 See Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 341 A.2d 105, 106 (Pa. 1975).
313 See generally Miller, supra note 310, at 273 n.8, for a discussion of cases in
which shunning caused damage to the shunned person's reputation and business
relationships.
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For communities that operate outside the framework of main-
stream society, the threat of ostracism functions as the equivalent of
state law. Without this threat, the group's ability to discipline its mem-
bers would be rendered ineffective. At the same time, however, the
norm of shunning, if excessively practiced, may collide with some
other legitimate state interest. Courts faced with a collision of com-
peting norms have had to balance the state's interests against the free
exercise claims of the religious group.3 14 In Paul v. Watchtower Bible &
Tract Society of New York,315 the Ninth Circuit upheld the right ofJeho-
vah's Witnesses to engage in the practice of shunning ex-members
against an ex-member's common law claims of defamation, fraud, and
outrageous conduct because of the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment and because "the practice of shunning. [did]
not... constitute a sufficient threat to the peace, safety, or morality of
the community as to warrant state intervention."
316
A different conclusion was reached in Bear v. Reformed Mennonite
Church.31 7 The plaintiff alleged that after his excommunication from
the church for criticizing church teachings and practices, he was se-
verely shunned by the church. As a result, his business, as well as his
marriage, suffered because shunning, as practiced by the church, in-
volved complete boycotting by church members, including his busi-
ness associates and his wife and children. The court found that the
complaint presented sufficient facts to raise the question of whether
shunning as practiced by the church could be considered "an exces-
sive interference within areas of 'paramount state concern,' i.e. the
maintenance of marriage and family relationship, alienation of affec-
tion, and the tortious interference with a business relation-
ship . . . even in light of the 'Establishment' and 'Free Exercise'
clauses of the First Amendment."
3 18
The relevant interests, of course, are not the same in rotating
credit associations or other nonreligious communities.3 19 There is no
constitutional privilege to balance against the state's interest in pro-
314 For a discussion and analysis of cases dealing with religious shunning, see i&
315 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1987).
316 Id. at 883.
317 341 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1975).
318 Id. at 107.
319 Professor Cooter pointed out that religious communities such as the Amish are
"ultimate communities" whereas business people form "instrumental communities."
See Cooter, supra note 2, at 1686. Rotating credit associations fal1 somewhere between
the two. The associations themselves are not insular "ultimate" communities but are
community markets embedded within culturally homogenous communities. For
purely business communities, "two natural limits on coercion of individuals by com-
munities" exist: the exit option and the mobility option. See id.
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viding a cause of action, if its underlying elements are met, for a given
tort. But there is, nonetheless, a case of competing interests between
the claims of community and state. On the one hand, the existence
and viability of any community that is marginal-culturally, relig-
iously, or economically-vis-a-vis society at large depend to a signifi-
cant degree on its cohesiveness. Cohesiveness depends in turn on the
community's ability to foster a group-based sense of unity balanced
against the individual's fear of being forced outside the embrace of
the group. The possibility that sanctions will be meted out for con-
duct that breaches community norms must be real enough to deter
actual breaches; at the same time, the costs inflicted on those who
deviate must be sufficiently severe to counteract defection.
Without the threat of state law, the threat of shunning-the sev-
erance of social and economic ties with the community-plays an im-
portant part in keeping members within the bounds of community
norms. While shunning is not the only means of ensuring compliance
(shame and guilt also play a part), it is an effective one. In some Ko-
rean-American communities, "defaulting would make it nearly impos-
sible to get a job among Korean Americans or even a marriage
partner."320 This may be so not because of any orchestrated campaign
by community leaders to shun or to pressure others into shunning the
defaulting person. It may be so simply because a person who defaults
is judged by others to be untrustworthy, and an untrustworthy person
is not anyone's first choice for a business or marriage partner.32'
Through mobility, an individual can escape coercion by one community and
find another community that is more congenial. In contrast, the creation of
a mass society through the destruction of communities reduces the alterna-
tives available to everyone. The limits of self-help should be assessed before a
court grants a legal remedy to an individual who feels repressed by his
community.
Id. The option of exit for a shunned member of a rotating credit association will
depend on the insularity of an ethnic community and the extent to which a member
feels culturally, economically, and psychologically bound to that particular ethnic
community.
320 Jordan Rappaport, The Korean Example, NEW DEMOCRAT, May 1992, at 22.
321 See Gruter, supra note 309, at 271-79. "Ostracism" may exist even without the
affirmative practice of active shunning. Andrew Yoder, who had left the Amish
church and purchased a car, sued several officials of the Amish Church for violating
his right of religious freedom and exacerbating his stomach ulcers when it ordered its
members to shun him. The jury awarded him monetary damages, and the judge or-
dered church officials to lift the shunning order. To satisfy the monetary judgment in
Yoder's favor, the sheriff seized the property of one of the church officials. Eventu-
ally, church officials removed the ban. Yoder remained isolated from the community,
however, even after the removal and reversal of the church's shunning order. See id.
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It is unlikely that the latter instance would give rise to any cause
of action. On the other hand, activities, even those motivated by reli-
gious beliefs, that rise to the level of harassment, intimidation, or
threats may be sufficiently excessive or outrageous to provide the
plaintiff with a cause of action under the relevant state law.3 22 In
those cases, the court would have to make a case-by-case determina-
tion, balancing the particular norms of the community against other
areas of paramount state concern. In Lide v. Miller,323 a dentist sued
church elders for libel, slander, and tortious interference with his
business relations when the elders proclaimed the plaintiff's miscon-
duct to the congregation, causing harm to his reputation and dental
practice. The court of appeals overturned a lower court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the church and remanded the case for
trial upon the merits on the grounds that, although "civil courts have
no jurisdiction over and no concern with, purely ecclesiastical ques-
tions and controversies, they do have jurisdiction as to civil, contract
and property rights even though such rights are involved in, or arise
from, a church controversy."3 24 According to the court, the alleged
libelous and slanderous communications should have been subject to
more scrutiny at the trial level.
This approach, if transposed into the rotating credit association
context, may be a workable middle ground that allows the court to
enforce the parties' "no law" understanding and defer to the group's
norms on matters directly within the core of the association's activi-
ties, for example, those involving how much or when contributions
should be made, how priority drawings are determined by the
group-whether by lottery, by rotation, or by interest bidding-
whether and under what circumstances collateral may be required,
and whether and to what extent the organizer is or is not jointly and
severally liable in a case of default by a participant. Other matters that
are not directly related to the issues of saving and lending, even if they
arise from the association's activities, may be examined by the court if
they touch upon some area of paramount state concern, such as the
state's interest in providing a cause of action for common law
defamation.
322 See Carrieri v. Bush, 419 P.2d 132, 137 (Wash. 1966) (holding that although
the church members' acts, done in furtherance of their religious belief, would be
constitutionally privileged under the facts of the case, the privilege was nullified when
the church caused ill will, intimidation, and threats to be issued against the plaintiff
and caused plaintiff's wife to leave him because she was persistently told her husband
was a devil).
323 573 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978, no writ).
324 Id. at 615 (citations omitted).
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In sum, my proposal for this Part of the Article can be restated in
the following way: for reasons discussed above, where norms are so-
cially beneficial-for example, norms that advance the virtues of com-
munity as well as the production of social capital and further the
economic viability of marginal groups-the state should respect and
promote them. Rotating credit associations represent one instance of
community market formation and community participation and em-
powerment despite impediments caused by open market imperfec-
tions. The norms of trust and reciprocity that further community
exchanges and allow transaction costs to be lowered can best be pro-
moted by a "hands off' posture described above. Judicial interference
in most instances will result in the erosion of community and infor-
mality in favor of a more formal contractual regime. Imposing a con-
tractual regime of formal transactions on informal credit associations
would be too costly, from both a transaction and a litigation stand-
point, given the costs of gathering information, screening potential
applicants, drafting contracts, monitoring the performance of borrow-
ers, and litigation costs, as well as the uncertainty of recovery.32 5 Addi-
tionally, requiring adherence to formality would simply replicate the
concomitant costs that already deter financial institutions in the for-
mal economy from providing credit to low-income communities.
Additionally, and perhaps most significantly, open market alter-
natives are not available, which is why it is all the more important for
courts to allow the community to operate on and draw from commu-
nity norms without the threat that the formality of state law will infect
the community's social capital base. While certain private regimes of
trade, for example, the predominantly Orthodox Jewish diamond in-
dustry in New York, "ha[ve] systematically rejected state-created
law"32 6 by subjecting all transactions to a private order of industry
norms and usage, rotating credit associations have emerged not by
choice but by necessity-not only to lower costs behind a transaction
but also to remove barriers that discourage actors acting from a ra-
tional cost-benefit basis from entering into the transaction in the first
place. In other words, rotating credit associations exist not simply to
lower the transaction costs of an existing market. They represent,
rather, an example of a community market that emerges precisely be-
cause the transaction at issue-lending to lower-income borrowers-is
in many instances not viable on the open market. The situation they
present, then, is not only one of lowering transaction costs in order to
325 See generally Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 97, at 132-38.
326 Id. at 115.
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make transactions more efficient, but rather one of lowering transac-
tion costs in order to allow a market to emerge.
B. Linkages Between Markets
Aside from whether courts or legislators should defer to private
norms, there is also the issue of private lawmaking by rotating credit
associations and whether and to what extent it can be replicated in the
open market.3 27 In this Section, I examine whether or not linkages
between the open market and the community market can or should
be introduced. For example, which structural features of rotating
credit associations provide their comparative advantage, and how can
they be transferred to and simulated by the formal lending sector?
Spurred by the high success rate of rotating credit associations,
ethnic banks, in fact, have been more willing to evaluate creditworthi-
ness by resorting to criteria other than mere credit history. Korean-
owned banks are beginning to adopt some of the criteria used by ro-
tating credit associations and emphasize social rather than economic
collateral-for example, peer pressure, family connections, commu-
nity, and identity32 8-as a low-cost screening and monitoring mecha-
nism. Also, banks in Los Angeles' Koreatown, in particular, have
begun to emulate the structural incentives of rotating credit associa-
tions. Hanmi Bank, a Korean-owned bank, allows depositors who
enter into a ten- or twelve-month $10,000 savings plan to be eligible
for a lump sum advance of the entire $10,000 after three or four
months of savings.
329
327 Professor Avery Katz noted that not enough investment has been placed on the
study of "trade association rules, not for the purpose of advising courts and legislators
whether to defer to such rules, but for the purpose of helping other trade associa-
tions decide whether to imitate them or instead to draft their own new forms." Katz,
supra note 19, at 1757.
328 According to Benjamin Hong, Chief Executive Officer of Hanmi Bank, a Ko-
rean-owned, state-chartered bank, Hanmi Bank considers the applicant's "brothers,
his uncles, his parents, and his families, of course, and... what kind of church he
goes to, what kind of association he belongs to." ABC News (ABC television broadcast,
Sept. 13, 1992) (transcript on file with Notre Dame Law Review).
329 See Schifrin, supra note 131, at 92; see also Frantz, supra note 301, at 1 ("Under
a plan introduced ... by Hanmi Bank, a customer who agrees to save $1,000 a month
for 10 months can borrow $10,000 from the bank at the end of three months. The
customer continues to collect interest on the savings while paying off the loan's prin-
cipal and interest."); Reinhold, supra note 301, at 4 ("The would-be borrower agrees
to deposit, for example, $100,000 over 24 months. After three or four months, he
becomes eligible to borrow the full $100,000 at 2.5 points above the prime rate.. .. ");
Arax, supra note 131, at 1 (noting that Hanmi bank allows customers who agree to
save $1,000 a month for 10 months to borrow $10,000 after the end of the third
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Under such a kye-like program, depositors typically determine
their total savings plan amount and are permitted to take out a loan
up to that amount once deposits equal one-third of the total plan.
3 3 0
Hanmi's kye-like Business Installment Plan, in addition, allows busi-
ness customers who have deposited their full amount to take out addi-
tional loans for the total plan amount, even if money set aside under
the plan has been withdrawn.
3 31
Entities similar to a rotating credit association may be organized
directly by a bank. As Michael Cunningham, president of Creative
Investment Research described it, "[m] embers from inner-city neigh-
borhoods would contribute to a bank account each month until the
pool reached sufficient size. Then the bank would lend to one of the
members, using the pool as collateral. If the borrower defaulted, the
remaining members would have to cover the short fall.13 3 2 Presuma-
bly, for the arrangement to benefit the borrower, the loan amount
extended by the bank would have to be greater than the members'
aggregate savings account. Like the traditional rotating credit associa-
tion, the size of each credit pool would also be commensurate with
the credit needs of the individual members.33 3 Hanmi Bank also
planned to institute other plans modeled even more closely after the
kye. Under these plans, groups of up to ten members could obtain
loans from the bank, based on joint guarantees from members of the
group.3 34 Like a kye, the group members would function as mutual
monitors, screeners, and enforcers and thus allow the bank to signifi-
cantly reduce its transaction costs. Hanmi Bank "is trying to tap the
more traditional needs of its customers by bringing the kyes out of the
month). Hanmi Bank was founded in 1982 by Korean businesspeople to serve the
Korean American population whom the bank's founders believed were not getting
adequate services from conventional, mainstream banks. See Community Bank's Hard
Work Raises CRA Grade, THE REGULATORY COMPLIANCE WATCH, July 25, 1994, at 2.
330 See Appeal of Savings Plans is Growing, A.B.A. BANKING J., Sept. 1991, at 51.
331 See id. Other forced savings plans also operate under principles modeled after
the kye. Peterson Bank of Chicago allows customers to determine the total plan
amount and the increments for each installment. Once half of the planned amount
has been deposited, customers are allowed to withdraw from their accounts without
penalty. See id.
332 Elyssa Getreu, Taking a Lesson from Korea for Lending in the Inner City, AM.
BANKER, June 29, 1992, at 7.
333 However, according to Michael Cunningham, while the "kye concept works for
Koreans because they 'have a strong cash flow to begin with,' .. . [t]he savings habits
of other minorities might be an impediment to his version of the program." Id. (cita-
tion omitted).
334 See Franz, supra note 301, at Al.
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restaurants and into the bank," 335 in other words, through linkages
between the open and the community markets.
Concepts such as mutual monitoring and joint liability that gov-
ern rotating credit associations can be introduced to increase the like-
lihood of repayment in other contexts as well. Under this concept,
the pool may be guaranteed by a third party entity such as the Small
Business Administration.33 6 This structure would allow the bank to
sell the loan portfolio on the secondary market and hence increase its
capital pool for additional lending,337 and it would at the same time
encourage microloans-small loans to borrowers who cannot meet
the collateral requirement and other criteria of creditworthiness de-
manded by banks.
Another way of introducing the concept of mutual monitoring so
crucial to the success of rotating credit associations is to adopt a lend-
ing method used by the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh.33 8 Grameen
Bank's "lending circle," which uses joint liability to ensure mutual
monitoring among the circle's members, is similar in concept to that
used in rotating credit associations. The circle consists of five mem-
bers, and lending is made on the basis of a "two, two, one" scheme.
The bank lends to two members of the group first. Then, upon satis-
faction of the loan, the bank lends to two additional members, and
finally the fifth. The group's members act as coguarantors. Addition-
ally, should one member prove to be delinquent, her action would
jeopardize the entire group's eligibility for loans from the bank.339 As
a result, "because it is the group-not the bank-that initially evalu-
335 Id.
336 Although once a record of creditworthiness is established, the pool itself,
rather than a government entity, can serve as security for additional loans by the
bank.
337 See Getreu, supra note 332, at 7; see also Lewis D. Solomon, Microenterprise:
Human Reconstruction in America's Inner Cities, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 191, 217
(1992). For a discussion of microenterprises, see id.
338 The Grameen Bank was founded for the express purpose of offering "poor
people credit without collateral." Mohammad A. Auwal, Promoting Microcapitalism in
the Service of the Poor: The Grameen Model and Its Cross-Cultural Adaptation, 33 J. Bus.
Comm. 27 (1996). See also THE GRAMEEN READER: TRAINING MATERIALS FOR THE INTER-
NATIONAL REPLICATION OF THE GRAMEEN BANK FneANCIAL SYSTEM FOR REDUCTION OF
RURAL POVERTY (David S. Gibbons ed., 1992).
339 The difference between the Grameen Bank or other similar lending circles
and rotating credit associations is that in the former, borrowers borrow from a third-
party entity-a bank-whereas in the latter, borrowers in essence borrow from them-
selves and must rely on their own savings.
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ates loan proposals, '340 and because "[d] efaulters spoil things for eve-
rybody else, ... group members choose their partners wisely."
3 41
These approaches would reduce the problem of information
asymmetry and would allow banks to lower the transaction costs of
screening, monitoring, and enforcement. They would also introduce
the concept ofjoint liability described in Part I11342 and make it possi-
ble for banks to rely on the bottom-up mutual monitoring and en-
forcement mechanisms of the rotating credit associations.
One can argue that preferences for rotating credit associations
are unnecessary because they are merely variants of existing institu-
tions, such as community development banks.3 43 The latter, however,
cannot act as substitutes for rotating credit associations. They are too
institutionalized and too formal to achieve the comparative advantage
offered by community rotating credit associations. The forty or so
microbanker funds3 44 in the United States, heavily supported by foun-
dations, 345 "have yet to develop a systematic, self-sustaining methodol-
ogy."3 4 6 Due to the prevalence of below-market-rate loans to poor
340 Bornstein, supra note 177, at 40.
341 Id.
342 See supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
343 JULIA ANN PARZEN & MICHAEL HALL KIESCHNICK, CREDIT WHERE IT'S DUE 15
(1992) ("Financial institutions created primarily to foster economic development are
development banks. As financial institutions, they work to conserve their capital; as
development vehicles, they seek to contribute to economic development."). Commu-
nity development banks have sought to emulate rotating credit associations by adopt-
ing the informal peer-group "lending circle" approach to lower their risk of lending.
Like commercial banks, they are chartered and regulated as insured depository insti-
tutions and at the same time are designed to fulfill social and development objectives
in addition to commercial objectives.
344 Microenterprise programs, which provide small loans from $500 to $25,000,
are usually accessed through community development banks. See Susan R. Jones,
Small Business and Community Economic Development: Transactional Lawyering for Social
Change and Economic Justice, 4 CLINIcAL L. REv. 195, 197 (1997). A microenterprise is
defined as "'a sole proprietorship, partnership or family business that has fewer than
five employees, does not generally have access to the commercial banking sector and
can initially utilize a loan under $15,000." Id. at 197 n.3 (citation omitted).
345 See Kenneth H. Bacon, Clinton Looks to a Bank in Bangladesh for Model to Help
U.S. Poor Get Loans, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1993, at A2.
346 Bornstein, supra note 177, at 40. Other studies have claimed approximately
one hundred microloan funds in the United States. Most use the peer monitoring
method and substitute traditional collateral requirement with social collateral. Such
funds include the Southern Development Bankcorp, a community development bank
in Arkansas which operates the Good Faith Fund, the Lakota Fund on the Pine Ridge
Indian Reservation in South Dakota, the Women's Self-Employment Project in Chi-
cago. The success rates of the microloan funds have been mixed. Administrative
costs of counseling and educating potential borrowers, as well as training the banks'
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borrowers, the high administrative costs-namely operating costs, em-
ployee salaries, office space, travel, training, promotion, and other
professional services, as well as costs of processing small loans-"no
microenterprise lender in the United States has come close to break-
ing even, and only a handful have more than a few hundred borrow-
ers."3 47 Profits earned by South Shore Bank in Chicago, for example,
are used to support activities by other developmental agencies associ-
ated with the Shorebank Corporation, and even though such activities
may be socially useful, they may also be "littered with barriers and
risks."348 Even the most ardent supporters admit that "[s]elf-suffi-
ciency in development banking... is the exception rather than the
rule. Development banks whose goal it is to redistribute wealth or to
address problems in very-low-income communities have generally re-
lied on large and ongoing subsidies to continue. 3
49
By contrast, rotating credit associations, which operate on a much
smaller scale than development banks, provide an additional benefit
for members by acting as community deposit institutions that are com-
pletely self-sustaining and self-funding. Because capitalization for the
association comes from the members themselves, rotating credit as-
sociations perform the necessary function of community savings mo-
bilization. Loans come only from the members' own contributions
and, as a result, rotating credit associations "force people who aren't
too disciplined into saving the money. "350
In many ways, then, while the formal public sector can promote
and preserve the community in which rotating credit associations op-
erate-by adopting an adjudicative philosophy that defers to commu-
nity norms when appropriate-there are also limits to the kinds of
linkages that can be forged between the formal and the community
economies of credit. Although state-subsidized entities, such as com-
staff in community development, are high. The amount required to run the Women's
Self-Employment Group, for example, is greater than the amount actually loaned to
borrowers. See Aruna Srinivasan, Intervention in Credit Markets and Development Lending,
FED. RESERvE BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REv., May-June 1994, at 13, 22.
347 Borstein, supra note 177, at 40; PARZEN & KiEscHiicE, supra note 343, at
115-29.
348 PARZEN & KEscHNiC, supra note 343, at 116. The Shorebank Corporation in
Chicago, for example, is an umbrella organization that includes a community devel-
opment bank, a for-profit real estate subsidiary, and a nonprofit training company.
Most development banks, however, cannot survive on its members' savings alone but
rather must be funded by grants from religious organizations, foundations, corpora-
tions, and state or local governments. These shareholders have not received nor do
they expect to receive dividends.
349 Id.
350 Reich, supra note 302, at 1
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munity development banks, may succeed in emulating some of the
benefits of rotating credit associations, the very involvement of the
state itself may result in a distortion of the particular mix of commu-
nity, informality, and flexibility that gives such entities their greatest
comparative advantage.
CONCLUSION
It is now commonplace for market proponents to defend the mo-
rality and efficiency of markets by reference to individual freedom
and allocative efficiency. At the top of the list of the market's virtues
is its respect for individual freedom through market interactions "to
affirm existing values, to contribute to their further growth and to
earn moral merit."3 51 Economic freedom is "an indispensable condi-
tion of all other freedom, and free enterprise both a necessary condi-
tion and a consequence of personal freedom."352 Markets are also
defensible because they maximize the efficient allocation of resources.
Each individual's freedom to further her own materialist impulses re-
sults in the maximization of individual and societal wealth.
35 3
In recent years, however, the reascendant interest in community
has led to an intense examination of the social values and virtues that
are not easily produced by the market or, as some communitarian crit-
ics of the market claim, are even crowded out and harmed by the
market.3 54 These critics question the claim of market advocates that
the market is nonjudgmental because it allocates goods and services
only in accordance with consumer demand without questioning or de-
fining such preferences. Indeed, market goals of wealth maximization
and economic efficiency, critics argue, are tautological: the market
produces whatever consumers value, but the very production of con-
sumer value is itself determined by the market.3 55 At least three con-
clusions can be drawn from this critique of the market. First, the
market is not simply a neutral mechanism for maximizing ends whose
natures and origins are exogenous to the market. Second, the teleol-
ogy of the market has led to the triumph of market values that glorify
self-interested behaviors and market competition over other
nonmarket values that promote civic virtues and the collective good.
351 F.A. Hayek, The Moral Element in Free Enterprise, in STDiEs IN PHILOSOPHY, POLI-
TICS AND ECONOMICs 229-30 (1967).
352 Id. at 229.
353 See generally Posner, supra note 62.
354 See SANDEL, supra note 290.
355 See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the
Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669 (1979); Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of
Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451 (1974).
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And third, market ideology itself is detrimental to the maintenance
and promotion of community because it promotes a naked view of the
individual as autonomous and socially atomized.
This Article has looked at the intersection of market and commu-
nity to explore how both converge without one promoting prefer-
ences that run counter to the other's. Rather, I have shown that
community norms of cooperation and commitment to the common
good deter naked self-interested behaviors and can produce the very
efficiency and wealth-producing effect that the market favors. In this
respect, the interaction of market and community reinforces the
wealth maximization potential of markets and the collective bonds of
community by aggregating, through the community market, the inter-
ests of the individual and the group to remedy imperfections neither
the state nor the open market could solve.
As I have demonstrated, while laws against discriminating and
redlining exist, they cannot fully address the problem of rational dis-
crimination and, in particular, rational redlining, as banks believe that
the economic costs of lending in low-income communities far out-
weigh the benefits. Given the screening, monitoring, and enforce-
ment costs incurred, the administrative burden of overseeing
relatively small loans that may come without collateral and other usual
indicia of creditworthiness is often too costly to make traditional lend-
ing economically worthwhile. Without the information exchange
mechanisms available to rotating credit associations to lower the costs
of screening, monitoring, and enforcing loans, banks subscribe in-
stead to wholly different standards in their evaluation of creditworthi-
ness. Despite the pressure exerted on banks by the passage of the
ECOA and the GRA, the public law model faces limitations that are
difficult to overcome without more radical intervention by the state.
From a rational, cost-benefit perspective, the open market is not capa-
ble of solving the problem of credit rationing and adverse selection
that banks face.
I have argued in this Article that formal public lawmaking should
be supplemented by informal private lawmaking and that the state
should favor supplementation of open market contracts with commu-
nity market contracts, where people opt into relational and status ar-
rangements. In rotating credit associations, communities rely on self-
enforcing norms to regulate and solve their community credit prob-
lem. By subscribing to the community's production of norms and
practices to enforce credit contracts, .rotating credit associations draw
on their members' social capital base of identity and trust and their
respective "reputational bonds" to create a systematic but private or-
dering of economic relations that manage to overcome the informa-
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tional and incentive barriers facing financial institutions in the formal
sector.
Largely outside the formal, state-created legal system, rotating
credit associations nonetheless induce a high level of compliance
from members whose internalization of community norms allows the
associations to engage in low-cost screening, monitoring, and enforce-
ment of the community's credit terms. This Article draws from and
builds on works in psychology and sociology to investigate how con-
structs of identity, community, and trust affect rational economic be-
haviors, and in the process perform a welfare-enhancing role by
expanding the availability of credit for those borrowers ineligible for
credit in the formal economy. In this respect, the Article demon-
strates that a community of shared vocabulary about rights and expec-
tations facilitates economic exchanges among members. To this
extent, the discourse on communitarian values has an economic effi-
ciency benefit that has been neglected in the debate on
communitarianism.
At the same time, however, I recognize that not all norms are
wealth-maximizing or socially beneficial, and thus not all norms
should be enforced or promoted by the state. Members of a rotating
credit association and the association itself share a common aggrega-
tion of interests so that the incentive structure of the group contains
built-in institutional arrangements that serve to stem force and coer-
cion. When the production of norms emerges from an incentive
structure that promotes cooperation, minimizes the risk of appropria-
tion, and produces, without negative economic spillover, economic ef-
ficiency by correcting the deficiencies of the open market, a strong
argument exists that the state should have the discretion to support
such norms and the entities that promote them.
"The accumulation of social capital . . . is a complicated and in
many ways mysterious cultural process. While governments can enact
policies that have the effect of depleting social capital, they have great
difficulties understanding how to build it up again."356 The key is to
forge the right balance needed to induce and maintain linkages be-
tween the public, open market and the community-based market in a
way that promotes norms that are economically efficient, socially ben-
eficial, and thus worth preserving.
356 FUKUYAMA, supra note 6, at 11.
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